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Title of paper: Airport Pricing Systems 
Author: Roberto Rendeiro Martin-Cejas 
Institution: Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria (Departamento de Economia 
Ap licada) 
Abstract 
Because of their continued importance airport charges and the pricing philosophies 
underlying them merit particular attention. On the one hand, it should be borne in mind 
that from the airlines’ point of view airport charges are an important issue since they 
impinge directly upon their own costs. For most european charter airlines airport 
charges represent around 15 per cent of total operating cost (see Doganis 1992). On 
the other hand, the airport pricing policy must provide a sound guide for future 
investments. This must be so because if prices reflect cost then demand levels will 
represent the true demand fot that facility and will thus provide an indication of whether 
additional units of that facility are needed at that price. Due to indivisibility investments 
in airport infrastructure pricing system becomes a critical issue. In this paper we 
describe the pricing policy which is being adopted in most of european airports. 
Additionaly we’ll describe any alternative pricing systems and finally we calculate the 
structure of landing fees at uncongested airports as an application of Ramsey Pricing 
with data from european airports. 
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Airport Pricing Systems 
1. -Introduction 
The basic pricing structure for several airports from differents continents is a weight- 
based landing fee plus a passenger charge on departing passenger. The similiarity in 
charging structure around the world occurs because most countries have adopted the 
recommendations made by ICAO and IATA. Both organizations have tried to achieve 
standardization of airport charges. However, weig ht-related charges may lead to poor 
utilization of resources, over-investment in facilities and users gaining at the expense 
of producers. For instances, the case where users who impose high costs by operating 
at night or at peak periods or by requiring special facilities are not charged accordingly. 
An efficient allocation of airport resource require that the price paid by any user reflects 
the costs which they impose on the airport. If prices reflect cost then demand level will 
represent the true demand, but if price below cost may estimulate extra demand and 
induce investment in facilities which do not cover their full costs. A key question, 
therefore, in assessing the suitability of airport pricing structures in a more commercially 
oriented environment is the degree to which they reflect costs.The shortcoming of 
traditional pricing structures pushe one inevitably towards alternative pricing structures 
like cost-related pricing: marginal cost pricing or Ramsey pricing. 
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describe the differents charges on 
european airports and the traditional pricing policy (average-cost pricing). Next, some 
alternative pricing strategies, as marginal cost pricing, Ramsey pricing and two part 
tariff are analysed. Section 4 presents a structure of landing fees at uncongested airport 
as an application of Ramsey Pricing. Finally, section 5, extracts some results. 
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2.-European Airports Charges 
A commercial aircraft landing at an airport faces a number of possible charges. The 
most common charges at European Aiports are : 
A)Aiport Related Charges: landing and take-off fees, passenger charges for terminal 
passengers and transfer passenger, parking charges, state imposed departure taxes, 
airbridge charges, security charges, terminal navigation charges, noise charges, night 
operation or lighting charges. 
B)Handling Charges: passenger handling, ramp handling, aircraft cleaning, supervision 
of handling services, bus, special assistance, executive lounge access, air start for 
engines, assistance to special needs for passengers. 
The major single source of revenue for most european airports has traditionally been 
revenue derived from landing fees charged to aircraft. Since the early days landing 
fees have been based on the weight of the aircraft usually the maximum take-off weight 
(MTOW). There is a charge per unit weight (e.g. per tonne, 1000 Ibs or Kgs.). 
Additionaly, a complex and diverse systems of surcharges and rebates on the basic 
landing fee are operated at different airports. These are usually of three kinds. They 
may be related to the distance or type of flight to noise levels of the aircraft or to night 
landings. In recent years several airports, especially in Europe, have introduced noise- 
related rebates or surcharges to encourage the use of quieter aircraft. For instance, 
Amsterdam and the larger French airports have quite complex noise surcharges for 
different aircraft types while most German airports have simpler surcharges. At airports 
not operating on a twenty-four-hours basis there is frequently an extra surcharge on 
those aircraft wishing to land and take-off during the shutdown period. Even when the 
airport is open for twenty-four hours there may be a special fee during night hours to 
cover the cost of runway lights, as happens at Athens and Italian airports. 
Beyond the free- parking period covered by the landing fee, which is generally two to 
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six hours, aircraft must pay a charge if parked on the airport's apron, taxiways ramp or 
hangars. The parking fee is normally an hourly charge. This charge is calculated 
usually on the basis of the aircraft's weight or less often on its area. 
The charges per passenger are an second very important source of airport revenue. 
The common practice among european airports is that this charges be levied directly 
by the airport on the airlines who incorporase the charge within the fare. However, this 
way to do is a major source of conflict between airlines and airports authorities. Airlines 
argue that including this charge in the ticket has adverse consequences. It entails the 
passenger paying more than the airport charge because the ticket price has to be 
increased by a greater amount both to cover increased commission paid to travel 
agents on the higher ticket price and to absorb the airlines'own administrative cost of 
handling the airports' passenger charges. The level of the passenger charge varies 
widely. There is a differential between domestic and internacional fees which may be 
justified on cost grounds because internacional passenger are more costly to handle 
in terms both of facilities and the space they require. 
Additional to the types of charge outlined above, there are a variety of charges which 
are lived by some airports. Among other, we point out a fuel throughput charge. This 
is in essence a royalty for the fuel concession granted in addition to the rental for space 
occupied by the fuel companies. Airports, also, are beginning to impose separate 
charges for specific facilities like fee for airbridges, buses or mobile lounges. Finally 
airport security charges are also be comming more widespread. 
We pointed out above that the passenger charges were the second very important 
source of airport revenue after aircraft landing fee, however, for some european 
airports, they are the most important. Below (see table l ) ,  we compare the most 
important charges per turnaround (4 hours between landing and take-off ) for Boeing 
737-200 (passenger: 114, range : 251 8 Kms and cruising speed: 793 Km/h). The case 
of London airports is a significant one. It is noticeable that at many airports the 
passenger-related charge has now become much more important than aircraft-related 
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landing fee based on weight. For about half the airports surveyed the passenger charge 
generated between 45 and 50 per cent of the total aeronautical charges. 
Table 1: Weight comparison of most important charges (Boeing 737- 200) 
Country Airport Landing parking passenger terminal 
fees charges charges navigation 
(%) (%I (W charges(%) 
Netherlands Amsterdam (Sch i pol) 41 .O 0.0 49.6 9.4 
Germany Munich (new) 48.0 0.0 43.0 9.0 
Belgium Brussels 43.1 0.0 56.9 0.0 
Portugal Lisbon 34.5 4.5 46.3 14.7 
United Kingdom ’ London (Gatwick) 15.3 16.9 52.0 15.8 
United Kingdom London (Heathrow) 22.5 9.7 54.2 13.6 
Spain Madrid 57.7 3.1 39.3 0.0 
Italy Milan (Linate) 32.5 0.6 52.9 13.9 
Norway Oslo 53.2 0.0 46.8 0.0 
France Paris (CGD) 38.8 3.0 41.7 16.5 
Austria Vienna (Schwechat) 55.5 0.0 44.5 0.0 
Denmark Copen hagen 50.5 0.0 49.5 0.0 
Finland Helsinki 49.6 4.3 46.2 0.0 
Germany Berlin 59.0 0.0 32.9 8.0 
Germany Frankfurt 46.6 2.5 42.5 8.4 
Source:TM Economics Ltd, 1992 (adapted). 
Most airports needs to geneate more revenue in response to rising cost often brought 
about by new investments or to reduce existing losses. The recommendation made by 
International Civil Aviation Organizations (ICAO) of recovering costs led to the use of 
the average cost as basic price. Dividing the costs incurred by the airport by the number 
of traffic units processed, provides a unitary tariff. This procedure can be applied 
separating the different components of the total cost in order to obtain tariffs for the 
different services provided. For example, the costs originated in the landing Area, such 
as runways maintenance, fire service, safety and use of control equipment, are divided 
by the number of tons processed to obtain the tariff corresponding to the landing rights, 
or the costs of the terminal building are divided by the number of passengers in order 
to derive the tariff applied to them. In this last case, the process must be made in a 
separate way for the different classes of traffic. This methodology constitutes the 
traditional pricing policy. 
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Air companies argue that this procedure is objective and fair, since all the users pay the 
same for using the same services. However, in fact the different operators impose 
different costs and, because of this, they have to pay different tariffs. For example, a 
company that operates in peak periods imposes a higher cost (capacity cost) than 
others that operate in off-peak periods. On the other hand it can happen that the tariff 
based on the average cost leads to an inefficient use of the available resources. 
Suppose that, for a certain airport, the tariff for the peak period is lower than the costs 
in that period5 and that it happens exactly the opposite for the off-peak period, which 
is perfectly possible in this procedure. Then, air companies would be stimulated to 
operate in peak periods, thus increasing congestion levels. If the situation is extreme, 
for example, the airport is operating at a level which is very close to its installed 
maximum capacity, this would lead to the need of widening that capacity. The final 
consequence would be the under-utilization of the installed capacity during most of the 
day, with the consequent increase in the average costs in those periods (see Toms, 
1994). 
The efficient allocation of airports limited resources requires that users pay a price for 
the services provided which reflects the costs they impose. This principle is not verified 
in the traditional pricing policy. Economic literature suggests a series of alternative 
procedures that allow the approach to the efficiency principles. Below we will make a 
short description of these methodologies. 
3.-Alternative Pricing Strategies 
Relating costs and prices: marginal-cost pricing 
Airports are production units whose capacities can only be increased by large and 
indivisible units that demand a high investment. For example, if the capacity of a given 
airport means handling a traffic of "d'aircrafts, to handle "n+l" aircraft would imply to 
' For example due to externalities generated by congestion. 
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widen its capacity, in that case, to build a new runway. In that context, an important 
point to take into account is the existing relationship between the rates charged to users 
and the need of amplification of the installed capacity. 
The cost of handling an additional passenger or aircraft unit in an airport that operates 
below its installed capacity at any time of the day is almost zero. In these conditions, 
an extra passenger or aircraft would produce a very small impact on the airport's 
operating costs. The costs associated with the terminal building and runways 
maintenance would be increased in a marginal way. The rates applied to passengers 
or aircrafts based on these costs would result very low and anyone who could afford 
them should have access to the airport's facilities. In this way the utilization of such 
facilities would be maximized. Figure 3 shows this situation' (see Doganis, 1992): 
Figure 1 : Marginal Cost (short and long term): 
Q, Q, Q, Q' Q" 2% 
runway movements per hour 
In the figure above, D is the present demand function, SRMC is the cost of an additional 
passenger or aircraft unit and Q, is the maximum number of movements per hour 
The graphic reasoning is made in terms of runways capacity. However, it can be made about 
~ any other senrice. 
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allowed by the installed capacity. The solution p7 = SRMC would imply a traffic volume 
of Q7. To cover the costs of the capital invested it would be necessary to set a price 
equal to p2, but this would make the demand hold back to Q,and the installed capacity 
would be under-utilized. Consequently, once the facilities are already built, and since 
the possibility of alternative uses does not exist in the short run, the solution p7 = SRMC 
would maximize the infrastructure utilization and the consumer benefit. The resulting 
losses would be': 
p, Q ,  - [p ,  Q,  +capital cosr] = -capital cost 
The rationale for this policy bases in the fact that setting a price over p7 would imply a 
capacity excess of 0,- Q2 On the other hand, according to the demand function D, the 
marginal cost is inferior to the value that the users would be willing to pay for an 
additional service unit. That means that the social benefit could increase (the consumer 
surplus would increase) if we do not consider the capital cost and establish a price 
equal to p7. 
If we change the initial situation and admit a greater traffic concentration in peak hours, 
the costs of operating during these periods are increased by the need of more staff 
and, furthermore, due to the intensive use of facilities. If the marginal cost of operating 
in peak hours and in off-peak hours shows large differences, then there is a reason to 
introduce separate charges for the two periods, which can be based on the short run 
marginal cost. According to Figure 1 , the charge for peak hours would be equal to p3, 
and the one for off-peak hours would be p7. Nevertheless, if the situation evolves in 
such a way that in peak periods traffic increases considerably, or what is the same, if 
demand function D, shifts to the right (D,'), an excess of demand would appear for both 
prices. These excesses of demand are represented by Q,- Q" and 0,- Q', and it would 
be necessary to charge p4 to avoid them. Any intermediate price between p4 and p7 
would not modify the total traffic level, which can not exceed the quantity 0,. However, 
7 CMa = dCV/dQ - /dCV = /CMa dQ - C V  = CMa /dQ = CMa Q = Pi Q 
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at p4 services would be used by those who value them the most. Once here it is 
possible to try to satisfy demand D,' widening the facilities or building another runway, 
for example. In this case, users would have to pay a price equal to the long run 
marginal cost (ps in figurel), which appears as a consequence of building and operating 
the new installation. The application of the price ps contracts demand to QS. If at this 
price the demand in the top hours continues growing, this would be a clear indication 
of the need of amplification of the installed capacity. 
Due to the own nature of the solution "price equal to marginal cost", this is unable to 
generate enough income to cover the generated costs. If airports are companies 
operated from a commercial point of view, they should be financially self-sufficient. 
However, if charges are based on the short run marginal cost, these do not generate 
enough income to cover capital costs. Consequently, the strict application of the rule 
"price equal to marginal cost" leads to losses, and this is unacceptable from the 
commercial point of view. 
The conclusion from above is that there is a need of finding a methodology that permits 
recovering costs and that, at the same time, does not produce any distortion in the 
allocation of resources. The technique commonly used to reach both objectives is 
known as "Ramsey pricing policy". 
Ramsey pricing 
Ramsey pricing policy suggests that, where the solution price equal to marginal cost 
does not generate enough income to cover costs, it would be economically more 
efficient to generate an extra income, appraising the different users in inverse 
relationship to the elasticity of the service demand. In other words, to appraise on the 
base of the willingness to pay of users. 
Morrison (1982) derived a Ramsey pricing structure for landing rights at uncongested 
airport. The objective is the maximization of the difference between social benefits and 
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costs subject to the obtainment of a certain quantity of income. The solution of the 
resulting Lagrangean provides a standard Ramsey solution which indicates that the 
percentual margin of price (landing rights) on the marginal cost must be inversely 
proportional to the price-elasticity of landing demand: 
pi - a(TC)/aQ, - A 1 - (-) . - (i=l ,...n) 
Pi 1 + A  e, 
Ramsey pricing structure is a quasi-optimum solution, since it permits covering costs 
without forgetting the principle of efficient allocation of the airport’s available capacity. 
It is, therefore, an alternative way of reducing the deficit incurred in the aeronautical 
operations of the airport, avoiding the need of any kind of subsidies. On the other hand, 
it permits to include in the tariffs structure the costs generated by externalities such as 
congestion, noise and pollution (see Oum and Tretheway, 1988). 
Two Parts Tariff 
Another alternative would be the establishment of a two parts tariff. This tax would try 
to cover fixed costs as well as the variable ones incurred in the production of the 
service. Concretely, the fixed costs (construction costs and capital costs) would be 
recovered through the establishment of a fixed charge independent of the level of 
utilization of the service, and the variable costs (maintenance costs and other costs 
caused by the utilization of the service) would be covered with a price that reflected the 
marginal value of the service. The principal problem of this system is shaded in the 
following question: Who must pay the fixed costs?. Suppose that all air companies must 
pay that cost (each one of them pays the same quantity). Since, normally, each 
company operates with different aircraft type, there would not be incentive to use those 
whose needs of runways design and construction were minimum (see Levine 1969). 
In summary, for uncongested airports marginal-cost pricing will result in deficits which 
are often unacceptable. The pricing problem is thus one of covering the deficit with as 
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small a deviation as posible from the optimal pattern of use. Ramsey pricing permits 
recovering cost without distorting too much the allocation of resources. Following 
Morrison (1982) we'll try to develop a Ramsey pricing model for uncongested 
hypothetical airport. 
4.-The structure of landing fees at uncongested airport: An application of Ramsey 
Pricing 
This section derives an example of Ramsey pricing model for Spanish airport data. We'll 
estimate an estructure of landing rights using the same formulation as in Morrison's 
work. First of all, the results presented are an first approximation. The values used for 
elasticity of demand for passenger trips related to distance of trip and the equation that 
estimate the total operating cost as a function of distance were not updated. The 
standard Ramsey pricing presented in Morrison's work is as follows: 
The landing right depends on the resulting marginal cost, on the price-elasticity of the 
passengers demand (qi in absolute value) and on the total cost of the flight. This last 
one, at the same time, depends on the aircraft size, as well as on the flight distance. 
The price-elasticity of the passengers demand indicates that it increases, in absolute 
value, with the distance of the trip'. To sum up, the key to reflect the true value of 
service lies in the aircraft size and distance? 
* We can assume two hypothesis about Q,: 1) it is a weighted average of the priceelasticity of the 
passengers demand with different flight distances, aboard the same aircraft or 2) the flight distance of all 
the passengers is identical to the flight distance of the aircraft. 
Users'willingness to pay depends on the flight distance. 
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The above equation can be solved for landing fees for different aircraft types and 
distance for a hypothetical airport. The values used for the elasticity of demand for 
passenger trips related to distance was: 
Table 2: Elasticity of demand for passenger trips related to distance 
Distance 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 
ni 1.04 1.10 1.14 1.152 1.162 1.17 1.174 
The operating cost for a given aircraft type and distance can be estimated by multiplying 
the operating cost per block hour for that aircraft type by the number of block hours for 
the flight. The result can be multiplied by two to obtain total flight cost. Morrison used 
block hours as a function of distance: 
Total operating cost per block hour . (0.5263 + 0.0019 0,) 
Operating cost per block hours in 1992 for different types of aircraft and other 
information to be used subsequently are presented in table 3. 
Table 3: Aircraft Characteristics (1992) 
Aircraft type 
Aircraft DC-9 MD-87 A-320 8-727 B-757 A-300 DC-10 8-747 
characteristics 
$/blockhour* 3748 3953 4445 4595 5846 6142 6603 8002 
Seats 105 109 147 1531164 200 256/260 268 41 8 
MTOW(ton)* 48.9 61.6 71.5 83.5 99.8 162.1 251.7 371.94 
MLW (ton)* 44.9 58.06 64.5 70.08 89.8 134 182.8 265.35 
*USA $ per block hour. 
*Maximum takeoff weight and maximum landing weight respectively. 
Source: Compiled by the author from Association of European Airlines (AEA) data. 
There was no available data to estimate marginal cost to the Spanish airport of an air 
carrier landing. The analysis was carried out for different values of marginal cost, with 
no significant change in the pattern of results. According to engineers of AENA'O the 
recommended value for marginal cost to be used in this study was $79. 
''Aeropuertos Espafioles y Navegaci6n Espafiola. 
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The value of K depends on the extent to which the revenue constraint is binding. The 
analysis which follows used a value for K of 0.088. This value was used because the 
fees generated were of the same order of magnitude as weight based fees actually 
charged in Spanish airports. A variety of values of K were used, and the general pattern 
of results remains the same. Given the values of the parameters for Ramsey pricing 
equation the structure of landing fees for different aircraft types and distances are 
presented in table 4: 
Table 4: Ramsey Pricing (USA $1992) 
Aircraft type 
Distance (Km) DC-9 MD-87 A-320 8-727 8-757 A-300 DC-10 B-747 
500 594 622 689 709 879 919 982 1172 
1000 866 909 1012 1043 1304 1365 1461 1753 
1500 1142 1200 1339 1381 1734 1818 1948 2342 
2000 1419 1492 1668 1721 2166 2272 2436 2934 
2500 1697 1785 1997 2061 2599 2727 2925 3527 
3000 1975 2078 2326 2402 3033 3182 341 5 41 20 
3500 2253 2371 2656 2743 3466 3638 3904 4717 
As Morrison found, two basic patterns c a n  be pointed out: 
First, landing fees for each aircrafl type increase with distance, because the 
derived demand for landings for longer flights is more inelastic than for shorter 
ones. Second, landing fees increase as aircraft size increases. This is due 
entirely to the flight-cost effect. 
The ratio of Ramsey prices in table 4 to current weight-based fees will be used to 
analyse the relative structure of the Ramsey prices. It is thus necessary to choose a 
level of weight-based fees (Le. a normalisation criterion) as basis for comparison. The 
normalisation criterion was chosen so that the ratio of fees for the DC-9 at 500 
kilometres equals one. Given the weight of the DC-9, this implies a level of weight- 
based fees of $12.147 per ton takeoff or landing weight. These ratios are shown in table 
5 and 6. 
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Table 5: Normalized ratio of Ramsey price to prices based on landing weight 
Aircraft type 
Distance (Km) DC-9 MD-87 A-320 8-727 8-757 A-300 DC-10 8-747 
500 
1000 
1500 
2000 
2500 
3000 
3500 
1 .oo 
1.45 
1.92 
2.38 
2.85 
3.32 
3.79 
0.88 0.88 
1.29 1.29 
1.70 1.71 
2.11 2.13 
2.53 2.55 
2.95 2.97 
3.36 3.39 
0.83 0.80 
1.22 1.20 
1.62 1.59 
2.02 1.99 
2.42 2.38 
2.82 2.78 
3.22 3.18 
~~ 
0.56 
0.84 
1.12 
1.40 
1.68 
1.95 
2.24 
0.44 0.36 
0.66 0.54 
0.88 0.73 
1.10 0.91 
1.32 1.09 
1.54 1.28 
1.76 1.46 
Table 6: Normalized ratio of Ramsey price to prices based on takeoff weight 
Aircraft type 
Distance(Km) DC-9 MD-87 A-320 6-727 6-757 A-300 DC-10 8-747 
~ 
500 1.00 0.83 0.79 0.70 0.72 0.47 0.32 0.26 
1000 1.45 1.21 1.16 1.03 1.07 0.69 0.48 0.39 
1500 1.92 1.60 1.54 1.36 1.43 0.92 0.64 0.52 
2000 2.38 1.99 1.92 1.70 1.79 1.15 0.80 0.65 
2500 2.85 2.38 2.30 2.03 2.14 1.38 0.96 0.78 
3000 3.32 2.77 2.68 2.37 2.50 1.61 1.12 0.91 
3500 3.79 3.16 3.05 2.70 2.86 1.85 1.28 1.04 
The results have shown the same trends as found by Morrison: 
Two consistent trends are apparent in the tables. First, for any given aircraft 
type, the ratios increase with distance. This indicates that the Ramsey prices 
increase with distance faster than the weight-based fees. (Indeed, the weight- 
based fees do not increase with distance). Second, for any given distance, the 
ratios decrease as aircraft size increase. This indicates that weig ht-based fees 
rise too rapidly with size (weight). Imposition of Ramsey pricing would result in 
increased fees for "small" planes on "long" flights and decreased fees for "large" 
planes on "short" flights. However, on average, small planes do not make long 
flights and large planes do not make short flights. At the average, then, the 
weight-based fees is not as distorted as the table suggests. But, of course, any 
flight which deviates from the average will be mispriced under the weight-based 
fees system. If, for some reason, airport have to use weight-based prices, since 
that the difference between takeoff weight and landing weight is fuel, takeoff 
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weight is, on average, better because incorporates the relevant dimensions of 
Ramsey prices (size and range). 
5.Summary 
Strict application of marginal-cost pricing w’ll lead to accounting losses at many airports, 
even though there may be improved efficiency in resource allocation respect to 
traditional price policy (average-cost pricing). Where marginal-cost pricing is unable to 
generate revenues to cover some required revenue target, then it is economically most 
efficient to raise the extra revenue required from different users in inverse relation to 
their elasticity of demand for airport services, in other words by charging on the basis 
of ability to pay. In combining marginal-cost pricing and the concept of ability to pay 
airport authorities have the possibility to close the gap between their income from 
marginal-cost charges and their targeted total revenue charging a more high price 
where demand is inelastic. Ramsey pricing reflects the true value of service; size of 
aircraft (weight) and distance of flight whitout distorting too much the allocative 
efficiency of marginal-cost pricing. 
we have to say that the results of Ramsey pricing exercise presented for Spanish 
airports datas need a more detailed research because the equations of the elasticities 
and total operating cost related to distance used in this study, was taken from DeVany’s 
work, and this formulation have to be updated. However, although the results are only 
a first approximation, they shown the same trend as found in Morrison’s work. Finally, 
as pointed out Oum and Tretheway (1988), a possible extension of this work is to 
consider the externalities (congestion, noise and air pollution) that impose aircraft 
movements on others. 
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/3 I. I-VTRODUCTIOiV 
Airport charsing practices in recent years have been based on a principal of cost-recovery rather than 
on the principal of cost-relatedness for facilities used and services provided. In Europe, a wide range 
of services and facilities are jointly provided by the publicly owned airport authorities. Several key 
studies have highlighted the capacity constraints currently existing at European airports and the 
additional constraints likely to develop as traffic growth continues at average rates of 5-6% per 
annum. With the liberalisation of inter-community air transport in 18 states of Europe by the end of 
1997, the issues of airport capacity allocation and efficient airport capacity management are critically 
important in determining the development of a truly competitive airline market for passenger and 
freight services. In this arena, a move towards a more market based procedure is welcome for all 
users and for those involved in the long term planning of air transport infrastructure requirements. 
There is a large body of literature proposins and supporting a more market-based approach towards 
charging systems, arguing that it will lead to greater efficiency in airport use and in long term capacity 
investments' However there are many difficulties associated with operationalising such charging 
mechanisms, some legal, some practical and some political. 
In this paper, these issues are discussed in relation to the CEC Consultation Paper on Airport 
Charges. This set of proposals was put forward by the Commission in 1995 and is expected to be 
agreed by the Council of Ministers and European Parliament during 1997. The proposals contained in 
the Consultation Paper are critically reviewed here, particularly in relation to (i) whether the proposals 
will make any difference to current charging practices and rates; (ii) the way in which individual 
European airport services and facilities are viewed as well as the view of the airport system as a 
whole; (iii) the possible role of the private sector in the provision and hnding of components of the 
suite of airport services and fbnctions. 
In the nest section of this paper, a framework for examining the nature of airport services is presented 
and the general issue of competition and privatisation in airport service provision is addressed. The 
I See for esample Doganis (1992): TRB (1991: 1990): Levine (196%: Carlin and Park (1970): Morrison (1982: 1987). 
Jones. Viehoff and Marks ( 1993 ). 
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section concludes by summarising the economic arguments surrounding the imposition of a marginal 
cost pricing scheme. In section 111, the CEC paper and the proposals are briefly reviewed. In section 
IV. problems associated with the CEC proposals are highlighted. Many of these issues came to light in 
the US, where a similar cost-based, non-discriminatory charging framework has been in place for 
some time. The main conclusions from this review are that the CEC proposals will be difficult to 
enforce because they are vague, implementation is left to the individual member states, and because 
they allow for a variety of approaches to charging systems which can include substantial 
cross-subsidisation across aeronautical and non aeronautical uses. The fact that the Commission will 
not have significant powers of enforcement reduce the impact which the proposals can have. 
II. THE XATC’RE OFAIRPORTSERVICES 
Fiirrctions arid ownershiv of civil airports: 
The basic fimctions of an airport are to provide access for aircraft to the national airspace, to permit 
easy interchange between aircraft and to facilitate the consolidation of traffic. In order to perform 
these hnctions, the airport must have several basic infrastructure elements present’ such as runway, 
taxiways, aprons (‘airside infiastructure’) and airport ground resources for passengers or cargo. The 
ground resource elements as well as airside infrastructure capacity dictate the airport’s air traffic 
capacity. 
Traditionally, European and LS airports have been in public ownership by local, regional or national 
governments or some combination of government tiers. Approximately 160 airports received 
scheduled international air sewices in the EU in 1991. This number has been expanding recently with 
the growth in services to regional airports encouraged by air transport liberalisation. With the 
exception of the London airports, the largest EU airports are owned by a combination of city, regional 
and national governments. The London airports are privately owned and operated by BAA PIC. In the 
US, the airports which are used by scheduled air carriers are virtually all publicly-owned facilities run 
by an agency on behalf of the state or local government. There are a small number of publicly-owned 
airports which are managed and run by private companies who receive a management fee for their 
services. No US airports have been privatised to date. 
The EU has taken substantial steps towards liberalising the air transport sector, particularly with the 
provisions in the so-called ’Third Package‘ of liberalisation measures. One of the cornerstones of 
these regulations is that there be free entry to international markets, and since April 1997, domestic 
markets for all EU registered carriers. As Hardaway (1991) noted, access to airport gates and 
terminals is critical in permitting effective competition to take place and “Denial of access serves as an 
absolute barrier to entry”. The constraints on existing airport capacity have been identified in several 
studies as one of the main elements which will determine the extent to which competition actually 
- In the US Document ”Policy Regarding Auport Rates and Charges” Federal Register: June 2 1, 1996 (Volume 6 1, Number 12 1 )] 
[Notices], the follo\cing distinction between aeronautical and non aeronautical uses is made: “The [US] Department [of 
Transportation] considers the aeronautical use of an auport to bc: any activity that involves, makes possible, is required for the 
safety Of. or is otherwise directly related to, the operation of aircraft. Aeronautical use includes services provided by air carriers 
related directly and substantially to the movement of passengers, baggage. mail and cargo on the airport. Persons, whether 
individuals or businesses, engaged in aeronautical involving the operation of aircrait, or providing flight support directly 
related to the operation of aircraft. are considered to bt aeronaurical users. Conversely, the Department considers that the 
operation by U.S. or foreign air carriers of facilities juch as a reservations center, headquarters office, or flight kitchen on an 
airport does not constitute an aeronautical use ...... Such facilities need not be located on an airport. A caniris decision to locate such 
facilities is based on the negotiation of a lease or sale of property. Accordingly, the Department relies on the normal forces Of 
competition for non aeronautical commercial or industrial property to assure that fees for such property are not excessive.” 
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develops in the liberalised EU market (Balfour (1995), Comite des Sages (1994), Doganis (1995), 
AEA (1996)). 
It can be arsued that the larger European and US airports have a monopoly position in relation to 
terminating or originating traffic (i.e. hinterland traffic) but face competition for connecting or 
transfemng traffics fiom other airports. In many large cities, there are two or more airports 
supporting air transportation and thus competing for the hinterland traffic as well as transferring 
traffics. The economic rationale for public ownership and operation is usually that some type of 
market failure exists and government regulation or direct involvement is required. The main types of 
market failure and other arguments for public ownership of airports (adapted from Button (1993) and 
Kahn (1988)) are as follows: 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
e 
0 
0 
0 
The containment of monopoly power 
The control of excessive competition 
The regulation of externalities 
The provision of public goods 
The provision of high costs infrastructure 
The integration of transport into wider economic policies 
The improvement in transport co-ordination 
The importance of the facility nationally 
The facilities may be natural monopolies 
Competition simply does not work well. 
It can be argued that many of these factors continue to be relevant and substantive in relation to 
continued public ownership and provision of airports. The key points of concern are (i) whether these 
issues are relevant t o 4  of the services provided at airports, or if it is the case that users would benefit 
and efficiency would be improved if some airport services were competitively provided and (ii) for 
services which remain in public ownership, what forms of economic regulation will optimise efficiency 
and capital investment ? 
Concerns in the US about privatisation have highlighted two main issues: 
1 .  That privatised airports may not be able to hnd long term maintenance and capacity expansion 
programmes 
2. The issue of access (for certain carriers as well as for general aviation users) may be problematic 
under a privatised system of operation, particularly if capacity constraints exist or are likely to exist in 
the hture. 
An extensive study undertaken by the World Bank in 1995 (Juan, 1995) suggested that, on the basis 
of relatively small scale private sector participation in airport ownership so far, the available data 
indicates that both the quality of service and investment commitments have significantly improved. 
This is the situation in which the private sector has a significant participation in management and 
ownership. The effect of airport privatisation on airport pricing policies is difficult to measure, but the 
following general patterns are noted: (i) airside charges are not lower, nor have they increased 
substantially than under the previous public ownership, hut the charges pricing mechanisms have 
become more complex (ii) airside charses are subject to price-cap economic regulation (iii) there has 
been intense development of non-aeronautical commercial airport revenues at relatively high prices. 
We note that non aeronautical users of airport facilities have alternatives in terms of locational choice 
and property fees’. 
At present. there are few constraints on a private developer building car parks or hotels on lands adjacent to a large 
number of European airports and competing with the airport authority in the provision of these senices. If air side 
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The nature and range of airDort services: 
Table 1 gives a schematic representation of the categories of airport services typically found at 
European and US airports. The services are grouped according to (a) whether the airport service is an 
‘aeronautical use’ or non-aeronautical use (b) whether there is general public access or access only for 
those travelling by air (c) whether or not there is direct airside access. Fer airside facilities, it is argued 
that duplication of runway, taxiway and apron facilities is not advisable for the following reasons: (i) 
these infrastructural items require substantial capital invesrments and should generate fees sufficient 
only to cover replacement costs. (ii) these facilities have significant planning requirements in terms of 
zoning of adjacent lands, and surface transport access. (iii) these facilities have merit good 
characteristics and have non-economic potential benefits or insurance aspects. For reasons of defence 
or growth and development, it may be necessary to provide excess capacity or facilities of a higher 
technical standard than are actually required to meet current demand with current technology. 
Groundside facilities can be provided in a number of ways !a)  through continued public ownership by 
a single airport company (b) through franchised arrangements with public or private 
managemendoperator companies (c) through mixed publidprivate ownership by multiple companies 
(d) through privately owned terminal companies, which have airside access (see Juan, (1995) for 
lengthy discussion of these options). From an economics standpoint, the main issue is whether 
competition in the provision of these services is necessary, feasible and if it can be justified in terms of 
keeping rates and costs low producing a reasonable standard of service quality. While the costs 
and benefits of each alternative approach need to be assessed for particular facilities. it is clear that 
European airports offer an increasing range of services and facilities to their different customer 
groups. Retail franchising and duty free sales for example are very lucrative areas for the airports and 
have allowed for investment and expansion of the airport‘s suite of services and facilities. The airports 
have maintained a dominant or monopoly position for this suite of services and facilities. In many 
instances, landing fees have been kept low because cross-subsidisation has taken place 
Many companies doing business at an airport pay both rental for the space which they occupy and a 
gross receipts fee based on their turnover at the airport. In computing camer fees, some airports may 
take these concessionaire revenues fees into account. There are two methods used for the 
computation of air camer fees, the residual method and the compensatory method. \Vith the former, 
the airport deducts all revenue earned from non-airline sources from its total annual budget. The 
airlines then pay the residual. With the latter approach, the airport is divided into various cost centres 
and the airlines pay their fees based on the measures of airport services or facilities Lvhich they use 
(for example, parking, terminals etc.) [AT& (1995)l. If competition is permitted in the provision of 
terminal and groundside services, then this cross-subsidisation is unlikely to continue. With 
competition in groundside services, revenues for infrastructure use can be collected either by billing 
carriers separately for each service or by imposing collection requirements on a single agent. 
The provision of basic airside infrastructure requires significant capital investment as well as having 
substantial planning requirements. In addition, the merit good characteristics and insurance aspects 
provide strong argument for continued public sector ownership and involvement. However in relation 
to the other types of airport services, a wide range of possibilities exist for raising the level of private 
sector involvement and imposing competitive or efficiency conditions on the production of services. 
The World Bank report (Juan, 1995) gives examples of a variety of circumstances and contexts. 
Generally speaking, the US airport offer a narrower range of services and facilities to airlines and 
passengers and have exercised greater Bexibility in permit:ing private sector development and use of 
publicly owned airport lands. 
capacih is required however. constraints esist because of the airport authorih’s ownership of most of the land tracts 
adjacent to the runways and taxiways. 
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The optimum pricing mechanisms for the use of these services and facilities will be briefly discussed 
before the CEC document is introduced. 
Omimnl Pricing for Reairluted Monovolv miti  nirblrc ririlrtirs: 
The basic economic principles of marginal cost pricing suggest that welfare is maximised where prices 
are set equal to long run marginal cost. As with economies of scale, under economies of scope, price 
will be below average costs with this marginal cost pricing prescription As Kahn (1988) points out, 
the traditional legal criteria of proper public utility rates have always borne a strong resemblance to 
the criteria of the competitive market in loilg run equilibrium The principal benchmark for ‘just and 
reasonable’ rate levels has been the cost of producing including the necessary return on capital. The 
rule that individual rates not be unduly discriminatory similarly has been defined in terms of the 
respective costs of the various services. However, it is short run marginal cost to which price should 
be equated because it is the short run marginal cost which reflects the social opportunity cost of 
providing the additional unit that buyers are at any time trying to decide to buy. Marginal costs look 
to the future not the past since it is only future costs that can be saved if production is not undertaken. 
In the presence of competition, it is long run and not short run costs which should set the floor. If 
capital costs are to be included in price, then it should be clear that those capital costs are those that 
will have to be covered over time in the future if service is to continue to be rendered. 
The issue then arises as to whether all users should pay the price which includes the capacity costs. 
Kahn argues that the off-peak users should not pay these costs since they do not impose these costs 
on society once their demand is sufficiently slight and inelastic that even at a zero cost, no congestion 
occurs at the time when they use the facility. The necessity for expansion is imposed by the customers 
at the peak hours. If the same type of capacity sertres all users, zapacity costs should be levied only on 
utilisation at the peak. This peak responsibility pricing is not discriminatory between peak and 
off-peak users (that (discrimination) implies that the price differences are not based on cost 
differences), rather it reflects the fact that there is a genuine increase in the costs of supplying users at 
the peak compared with the off-peak. The proposal then is to reflect the cost difference in respective 
prices. 
When infrastructure capacity or plant is built far in advance of total need (because for example of 
economies of scale), charging deprecisrion in equal instalmenrs imposes a disproportionately heavy 
burden on customers in earlier years, \vhen much of the capacity lies idle. This idle capacity is of 
benefit to future not present customers. Economic efficiency suggests concentrating capital charges in 
the later years. 
Finally, in situations of economies of scale or scope, where price set equal to marginal cost will yield a 
loss, Ramsey prices eliminate the deficit while minimising the loss in welfare that results. Ramsey 
prices maximise social welfare but also require revenues to cover costs: the resulting prices achieves 
as great a level of social welfare as possible in the presence of realities that prevent the use of 
I marginal cost prices. 
IIL CEC COMiklON FRAME WORK FOR AIRPORT CHARGING SYSTEMS 
The CEC consultation paper considers the introduction of a common framework for airport charging 
systems in the Community. The paper prcposes that CEC airport charses should reflect the real cost 
of providing the facilities and services to users, with no discrimination between intra-community air 
services. The results of a recent study by the Commission included in the consultation document, 
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indicate very substantial differentials in lmding and other charges applied to domestic as opposed to 
international services. The paper further proposes that users should only be charged for facilities used 
and services provided and only on a cost-related basis, with information on airport charging systems 
being made available to users to ensure transparency. The paper envisages that airport charging 
systems should provide airports with a means to efficiently manage available capacity and contain 
impacts on the environment. Willingness-to-pay or Ramsey pricing mechanisms can be applied once 
they are operated in a consistent and non-discriminatory manner. Finally the paper provides for 
modulations in the charging system in the cases of air links tc peripheral, remote or less developed 
regions. In summary, the paper suggests that airport chzrging systems should meet the criteria of 
non-discrimination, cost-relatedness ar,d transparency. Tile cmsultation paper is a short and very 
general statement of aspiration, which is vague about the airport services which are to be covered by 
the framework. The framework does not outline any penalties associated with non-adherence, nor 
does it provide for arbitration in the case of disputes. The time frame for implementation of the 
proposals is unclear. 
The proposals contained in the CEC consultation document 2re supported in principle by the ICAO 
states. From the viewpoint of economic esciency, the proposals make sense in trying to ensure 
efficient allocation and use of existing airport capacity as well as allowing for superior planning of 
additional capacity investments. Currently EU airports are knded through local, regional and or 
national government funding and more recently from EU funds. The airport facilities have been 
provided as public utilities and as Doganis (1992) points out, ccrrent charges are typically based on a 
cost-recovery process and averaged for different categories of users based on weight of aircraft. The 
literature in economics has shown that when demand for transport infrastructure exceeds available 
capacity at different times of the day or in different seasons. :hen social marginal cost pricing which 
includes external congestion costs opus the first-best solution to the pricing of such congested 
infrastructure [Oum & Zhang (1990); Morrison (1983); Doganis (1992)l. The literature has then 
looked at the issue of cost recovery from capacity investments using revenues from congestion tolls. 
In this regard, it is argued that when capacity expansion is divisible (i.e. it can be incrementally and 
continuously expanded to meet growing demand), then under constant returns to scale (in relation to 
construction of the infrastructure capacity) revenue from conges:ion tolls will exactly equal the capital 
cost of the capacity investment, assuming that the average vriable cost function is homogenous of 
degree zero in traffic volumes and capacity. With increasing (decreasing) returns to scale in capacity 
construction, there will be a shortfall (sxplus) in the capita! costs from the congestion tolls. When the 
lumpy nature of capacity expansion is considered and the nature of demand is such that it is changing 
over time, then the airport authority may go through alternating periods of surplus and deficit before 
and after capacity expansion [Oum & Zhang (1990)l. In fact, the financial condition of the airport 
authority depends on the time path of the traffic growth over the investment cycle, which will of 
course affect the flow of congestion tolls. In cases where capacity cannot be expanded, then a 
rationing process based on 'willing-to-pay' is most efficiect in terns of allocating the scarce facility to 
those who most value it. However economic rents then accixe to the facility owner, who has a 
monopoly or quasi-monopoly position OR supply. Airports do not exist in isolation and can offer 
complementary or substitute services particularly for connecting traffic. The airports should be viewed 
as a network or system, since there is a significant proportion of traffic which can be redistributed to 
uncongested facilities. 
The analysis of optimal congestion charges and capital recovery constraints needs to be expanded to 
consider the case of a system of airports. some of which are o!;ei-ating at peak capacity for several 
periods of the day and others operating ansistently below capasity, and where redistributing traffic 
through system pricing mechanisms mal' yield more efficient system capacity utilisation and more 
efficient costs for users and those effected by external costs. In relation to a road network, the 
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economics and regional science literature has shown the kinds of pricing decisions which may result 
(McDonald (1 995); Johanson & Mattson (1 995)). 
The current weight based landing and other airport charges sys~ern has been criticised because it does 
not relate directly to the costs which users impose on the airport facilities or other users. In terms of 
calculation of an Aircraft Classification Kumber (ACN) and a Pavement Classification Number (PCN) 
take into account the combined effects of weight, gear configuration and tyre pressures in assessing 
the damage by aircraft to airport pavements. The integration of these technical measures with other 
indicators of airport usage, such as the amount of time required of glide pathdapproach and runway 
space, spacing of aircraft based on Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) versus Visual Flight Rules (VFR), 
spacing of aircraft based on broad category of user (with gresttr vertical separation and temporal 
separation required in the case of light general aviation (G.\1 zircraft compared with jet aircraft) 
would certainly allow for more efficient pricing and allocation of airport capacity [see for example 
Alexander and Hall (1991); Small, Winston & Evans (1989)l. >!orrison (1987) suggests that there 
may be small welfare gains associated with shifting from weight based fees to marginal cost pricing 
procedures when airports are uncongested. Indeed such fees are reasonably consistent with net benefit 
maximisation. At congested airports however, the use of weight based fees is economically inefficient 
since "aircraft weight is a reasonable proxy for demand elasticity. ..(but)..a poor proxy for congestion 
costs" [Morrison, (1987)l. For congested airports, the weight based fee structure favours commuter 
airlines over other classes of airline. 
* the actual physical wear and tear caused by different classes of users, the ICAO procedures for the 
When congestion charges are not imposed in peak periods and there is excess demand for airport 
capacity, that capacity is allocated by a queuing system. Bishop and Thompson (1992) argue in 
relation to ATC that these arrangements lead to an increase in airlines' costs in serving peak periods 
but also to a reduction in passenger demand because of a deterioration in service quality. 
The CEC consultation paper requiring a cost-based chargng system, if properly enforced, should 
lead to an improvement in the 'efficiency and allocation of airport capacity. The fiamework addresses 
the need for cost-related charges, including external costs. Howzver there are several broad issues 
related to such charging procedures which need to be considered b&ore adoption of this framework. 
These issues will be raised in the next section. 
IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE PROPOSED COMMON FRAMEWORK 
In this section of the paper, the practical and legal difficulties associated with the proposals set out in 
the consultation paper will be presented and discussed. Some proposals for dealing with the 
difficulties are given and in other cases the need for assessments of current practices is highlighted. It 
should be stressed that many of the issues raised below are interrelated and point to the need for a 
EU-wide evaluation of difficulties and solutions. 
Svstem Li'ew of EU Airuorts Needed: 
The broad aim of the common fiamework is given as the "efficient operation of airports and fair and 
equal treatment of users". Throughout the consultation paper, the focus of attention seems to be on 
individual airports and the pricing of airport services and facilities in isolation. The possibility of a 
'system view' of EU airports does not receive any attention. In :he extensive literature assessing 
capacity and capacity constraints at US airports, the 'system approach' to managing existing capacity 
and planning for future capacity needs is consistentlj viewed as a series of Federal issues. The airports 
in a large domestic system like the US or the European internal market serve a whole variety of 
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different users, requiring different types of services Some of t h e  services are not location specific 
and at the congested airports, using pricing and other mechanisms to redistribute traffic to 
under-utilised airports is becoming a key strategy for coping uith congestion delays in the short to 
medium term. In the longer term, many of the larger airports wili A i J i  be able to expand their capacity 
for reasons of adequate space availability. eiivironmental restrictic!;j or legal or planning restrictions. 
Under these circumstances, the impositior! of congestion fees bas& on peak demand is problematic, if 
dealt with at the individual airport level. Legal cases in the US- and in France' have outlawed the 
imposition of such charges when they are not related to services actually provided by the airport for 
its customers. When such consesiion charges are to be use< to extend capacity through new 
investments, the charges are reasonable and can be upheld legail: Where airport capacity cannot be 
expanded and where the capacity is rationed, significant rents v\.i!! accrue to the airport owners. If 
airport capacity is viewed at the system level (or as a series of regional subsystems - which may be 
politically more palatable), then fbnds gathered through congestizr! charges may be allocated towards 
new airports projects or extensions at other airports in order to ?!!eviate congestion in the system. In 
the US, this view was proposed as a means of avoiding legal diliiculties with the charges6. This issue 
of the efficient management and operation of EU system capaciiy, and long term planning of system 
investment is a Union-wide issue. In some instances this sysrem view of the airports has been 
accepted. For example, the definition and strategic European vievv of the transport networks which 
make up the Trans-European Networks (TENS) refleci such 29 approach towards managing and 
developing key infrastructural networks which serve a variety of ism at different spatial scales. This 
system view needs to be assessed in the context of chargin9'pricinS mechanisms. 
Airvort services covered bv the fiamett ork: 
(i) Need to specifv what services &facilities are to be covered by this framework. 
In the introduction, the consultation paper provides a listing of r>?ical airport services. It is unclear 
whether this cost-related pricing scheme is to be applied to ATC services, Immigration and customs 
services, security services etc., all or most of which are provick? by government staff, rather than 
airport staff In the area of ATC, with the move towards harmonisxicn and standardisation as we11 as 
central flow management (a system apprcach), the investment rtqxtments for this program should 
be examined and linked to elements cf airport charges. In stction 2 of this paper, a broad 
categorisation of airport services was presented in order to define more precisely the types of services 
which were likely to remain as regulated monopolies and those which could be subjected to 
competition, thus allowing market mechanisms to determine pricins policies. 
(ii) Admimistratiom collection costs: 
Passenger charges are levied at the majority of European airper;. with the onus on the airline to 
collect the charge on behalf of the airpon. Doganis (1992) argues :%I this results in European carriers 
having the highest set of airport charges when compared with orher major international aviation 
markets. Passenger charges (as opposed to taxes) should also be cost-related and non-discriminatory, 
with rates being made publicly availatlc. In the UK for example, BAA plc. has calculated the terminal 
and ground costs associated with different classes of passengers (i.e. domestic/short-haul, 
intra-community/medium haul, long haul international and transir passengers) [Toms, (1 99 l), Doganis 
(1992)l. As with landing fees however, the imposition of congesion fees for use of terminal facilities 
during peak periods can be problematic dependins on hcv; passenger cangestion tolls are utilised. In 
the US until recently, passenger charges Lvere prohibited under the 1973 Anti-Head Tax Act (see 
See Chapter 6 of Winds of Change D,miestic Air TranjDort Since Derealat ion Transponation Research Board 
November 1987 French High Court case in idv ing  Aerport De Pans (see Dogsnis (1992)). 
Op. Cif, TRl3. 199 1. 
4 
Special Report 230.. TRB. Washington D.C. 1991. 
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Peters (1994)). Since 1990, 'Passenger Facility Charges' (PFCs) hat. 2 been permitted' , with the hnds 
being used for a defined set of purposes (fcr example, enhancing aii-px iapacity, safety, security and 
competition, or to reduce noise) The GXO (1990) outlined several clauses in the authorisation Act 
aimed at safeguarding the goals of the PFCs. In a European contst, these are worth considering in 
relation to the passenger charges imposed by airports. In summary the safeguard provisions aim to (i) 
ensure that the revenues generated are used for a narrowly defined set of possible projects, directly 
related to airport activities (ii) ensure that there is competitive access io new facilities, so that leasing 
of PFC-fhded facilities is done on a preferential lease basis ?'lis means that where incumbent 
carriers can block entry to pre-existing facilities (for a variety of i?.3sDnS), competitive access to new 
facilities will be ensured. Without this clause, the possibility of incumbenr carriers with exclusive-use 
lease of existing facilities could lease new PFC-fbnded facilities and continue to block entry by new 
carriers. (iii) the amount and number of passenger fees should be noted on a passenger's ticket and 
limited in the case of a multiple-segment trip. 
(iii) Bundling of airport services and cross-s1i bsidisationkross-cwdr!ng: 
Airport revenues accrue from several sources where a wide varietv of services and facilities are 
provided to users. For example (i) airlines pay landing fees and passenger fees covering runway and 
terminal usage; (ii) Other users (general aviation users) pay fuel flowage 5es  and (iii) concessionaires 
bid on rental rates or pay negotiated market rates for terminal space. TFe fact that airports are spatial 
monopolies or quasi-monopolies for certain categories of users would indicate a need to have some 
regulatory control over total revenues, while at the same time ensuring that the fees charged make the 
"airport as self-sustaining as possible under the circumstances existing at that particular airport" in the 
words of the US Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970. The generation of surplus revenues 
in the US and in the UK recently has raised issues relating to cross-crediting or cross-subsidisation 
among groups of revenue generators for the airports. 
The main issues relates to whether it is reasonable that airlines can p j  reduced landing and other 
charges if significant revenues are being raised by the airport on concessionaires. If such a discounting 
scheme is acceptable, then the implications once again for the long tern fbnding of airport capacity 
need to be investigated. Peters (1994) gives a very detailed discussion oflhe key US legal cases in this 
area. To summarise the two arguments: (1) Since concessions are fie-gented for the most part by 
airline passengers, then the charges for the wares sold by concesianaires are unavoidable by 
passengers*. The conclusion was then that when the airport charges a refital fee to concessionaires, it 
is equivalent to imposing a landing fee on an airline or imposing a head t ; = ~  on a passenger. So since 
concession rentals are unavoidable costs of travel, either the passenger or airline should be entitled to 
offset concession revenues against the operating costs of the airport as a whole. (2) Passengers at 
airports are not captive audiences for concessionaires and accordingly the high concession prices are 
an inescapable add-on to the cost of travel. The fact that airports generste significant revenue from 
concessionaires should not require them to cross-credit these revenues when establishing rates for 
airlines.' Gillen (1990) proposes that privatisation of airports wouia be a preferable option for 
achieving an economically efficient outcome. 
Recently in the UK, because of the provisions in the 1986 Airports Aci (which privatised BAA), a 
system of price regulation was introduced, determined by the retail price index minus an x-factor, 
borrowed from the previous privatisations of state monopolies. The x-factor is assessed by taking 
' These charges were authorised under Section 91 10 of the Aviation Safety and 
' City and County of Denver v. Continental Air Lines Inc.. 712 F.Supp.834 : i \ ? i -~ : .  see Peters(l994). Indeed in this 
case the federal district court upheld the right of Denver City and Count)' to use Stapleton concession revenues for the 
costs of a replacement airport. 
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E,xpansion Act of 1990. 
Indianapolis Airport Authorih v. American Air!ines. 733 f.2d 1261 (1954). s2c Fc:crs t1994). 
account of the profits earned fiom the airpdrts unregulated businzsse; ii concessionaires). The more 
that BAA earns on concessions, the more they have to reduce their ianding fees to airlines. The result 
has been a lowering of landing fees at the conyested Heathrow airport (srgE550 for a B747) and an 
increase of fees at under-utilised Stansted Airport (stgE715 for a B747)'". Essentially the issues here 
are how the overall revenue generated by airports is used and whether rebates or cross-crediting on 
landing and/or passenger fees is economically justified. The consultation document does not address 
these issues, despite the fact that permitting modulations in the charg..ig system (to facilitate for 
example a 'willingness-to-pay' criterion) could generate significant r e m  . - airports. 
Legal issues prohibiting short-term implementation of this Famework: 
When air carriers have contributed to airport capital investments and hzie agreements with airports 
relating to among other things, fixed charges and voting rights in re1at:rIn to capacity expansions, 
these types of agreements may limit the extent to which airport charges cr airport charging systems 
may be changed, at least in the short to medium term, as was the case ii~. the US [GAO (1990; 1991)l. 
In many instances there are also international agreements with non-EL countries which may have 
explicit limits on airport charges or changes to charging schemes. The extent to which such 
agreements exist should be investigated by the CEC and possible legal issues involved in imposing 
new charges or new charging systems. In the US, such agreements had a significant impact in 
preventing new entrants and in blocking airport plans to expand capacity [TRB (1990; 1991); Reilly 
(199O)l. If such agreements are in operation in Europe, then these agreements need to be considered 
in the context of long term capacity provision. To assess a feasible time h m e  for the implementation 
of this common framework and, the extent IO which lead time is necessary and reasonable for airports 
to shift from the current system to new cost-related system, the CEC needs to establish the extent of 
exclusive-use or long term lease clauses or any other legally binding agreements where changing 
charges or charging systems cannot be introduced immediately. 
Time-varvina maraincrl social cost Dricina 
Social marginal cost pricing calls for a pricing schedule which is tixe varyrig so that the user charges 
increase as the volume/capacity ratio increases and are reduced after capacity has been expanded. In 
practical terms, airport managers and indeed some economists argue that landing charges should not 
vary over time. Park (1989) however has shown that the welfaie loss associated with charging a 
constant optimal price is high relative to the social marginal cost pricing scheme which is 
time-varying. Such a time-varying pricing system is difficult to implemect, given that such charges for 
a given traffic mix on a given day may vary to reflect reduced capacity. T!?: capacity of some airport 
facilities (for example, the runway) is variable depending on such factcis 2s weather conditions and 
traffic mix. 
Social Air Services: 
Since social air services are currently designated and provided on a national basis, it is reasonable that 
individual governments specifj quotas for allocation of slots. and any modulation in airport charges for 
these services". However with the liberalisation of domestic air services scheduled for 1997, the 
provision of social air services within the EU and the allocation of slots and pricing of airport services 
at large and/or congested airports will become an inter-communitv marr3r. An assessment of the 
extent of these types of services would help to assess the need foi glidelines on quotas and 
modulations in airport charges required under current and fully-liberaiisei ircumstances. In the US, 
~~ 
"See Economist (September 1995) 
small communities (USDOT. 1990). 
Some economists would argue that a strict n;arket-based pricing mechanism wou!d result in a decline in services to 
10 
I I  
slot-controlled airports have specified numbers of commuter/regiorial carrizr slots per hour laid down 
by the FAA (GAO, 1994). 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has critically reviewed the CEC Consultation document on airpon charging systems. While 
the aims to introduce a non-discriminatory, transparent and cost-related framework for airport 
charging is welcome, there are many practical and legal difficulties which need to be addressed in the 
wake of such a fiamework being implemented. 
In this review it was argued that the CEC needs to view the pricing issix ?om a system perspective, 
since the identification and planning of the strategically important Trans-European Network is already 
a 'Union' as well as a regional concern. The fact that several of Europe's iirgest airports face or will 
face capacity constraints in the short to medium term, coupled with the increasingly significant 
environmental and physical constraints on infrastructure facility expansion, highlights the need to plan 
for the efficient distribution of current and new traffics. The airport system capacity needs to be 
planned and allocated in an economically efficient manner and the union-roie in pricing and allocation 
of revenues must be considered. 
It is unclear which charges are to be covered by the new fiamework: while landing and parking 
charges are certainly included, passenger charges, security, immigration and air traffic control for 
example, are not referred to directly. Airports earn revenue fiom a variety of sources, some regulated, 
some unregulated, such as concessionaires. The issue of cross-creditkg GT cross-subsidising landing 
and other charges needs to be addressed directly. 
The CEC paper proposes to introduce a fiamework for airport c h q i n g  qstems which is vague in 
terms of the charges covered. In addition, an assessment of the potential legal and other obstacles 
which may hinder its full implementation should have been completed before the framework is 
implemented. 
Airport capacity problems are recognised as a major constraint to entry ir, the airline industry in 
Europe. European carriers in an international context face a competitive dis?..avantage because of their 
relatively high costs, and.will need to reduce these as much as possib!e in the medium to long run. The 
industry forecasts suggest significant growth in European air traffic and also significant capacity 
problems. The CEC document does not contain specific proposals or mechanisms to address several 
important issues in the fbnding and operation of airport services and infiastrucrure. 
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1. Air transport liberalization: the consequences for airports. 
A key question that so far has received relatively little attention in the germane literature is 
that of the changes at various airports as a result of the EU liberalization policies. That is, 
presently, most major European airports still benefit from the so-called homecarrier 
phenomenon where the country’s publicly or semi-publicly owned carrier uses the country’s 
main airport as its gateway hub and, consequently, the home-carrier is also the principal user 
of this airport (in terms of proportion of total aircraft movements, number of passengers 
transported, connections, slots ownership, etc.). The country’s main airport has substantially 
benefited fiom these monopoly conditions of airline captivity, strongly determined by the 
bilateral system of international air transport regulation. Therefore European major airports 
were used to operate in essentially different markets, compared to the increasingly competitive 
markets of their home based carriers. This partly explains relative stability of transport 
volumes and financial results of European major airports compared to the relatively volatile 
financial results of most European national airlines. 
However the liberalization of European aviation is likely to change this situation. Market 
access is open now to all community carriers, i.e. carriers with majority ownership and 
effective control in the hands of EU citizens. Ticket prices are free, governments can only 
intervene in case of dumping or excessive pricing. A community airline can choose its seat in 
any of the 15 member states. Licensing procedures are harmonized between member states. 
Since a few months community carriers have unrestricted route access within the EU. 
Most probably this development will be extended to countries inside and outside Europe. Last 
year the European Commission got the mandate to start negotiations with 10 other European 
countries. In the meantime the EC has also started negotiations with the USA on so-called soft 
rights. In the meantime open skies agreements have been concluded between the USA and 
most of the EU member states to facilitate strategic alliances between airlines of the states 
involved. 
As a result of this on-going liberalization the model of the single ‘national’ carrier using the 
national home base as its single hub for the designated third, fourth and sixth freedom 
operations will stepwise disappear. Within the EU the concept of the national carrier has 
already been replaced by that of the community carrier. State ownership in more and more 
European carriers is reduced. On the longer run mergers or even bankruptcy will M e r  
undermine the ‘single national carrier - single national hub’ model in Europe. In the meantime 
strategic alliances between national carriers in Europe will already reduce the airlines’ loyalty 
to a single airport. Profit maximization and accountability to share holders will supersede the 
loyalty of these newly emerging alliances, probably looking for the opportunities of a multiple 
hub network to adequately cover the whole European market. 
As a consequence some European airports might see a substantial decline in arriving, 
departing and transfer traffic, thus in revenues and financial solvency, as well as in their 
connection to other inter-continental and intra-European destinations. At the same time other 
airports might realize a significant increase in traffic as they will be sought after by the profit 
maximizing airlines as their major gateway hubs. Which will be the loosing airports and 
which will be the winning ones? Can airports anticipate the actions of airlines in deregulated 
markets and utilize policies which will improve their relative position? If so, what should be 
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these anticipatory policies? These questions become the more urgent, since an increasing 
number of major European airports will be privatized in the near future. Although increasing 
airport congestion in Europe will also be reflected in a growing demand pressure for airport 
slots, this is not a guarantee for a stable transport volume growth of individual airports. The 
more volatile the market is, the more vulnerable privatized airports become. 
Therefore the main issue of this study is the analysis of the opportunities of major European 
airports to become a central hub as a result of the network choices made by the new European 
airlines in a completely liberalized market. 
In a previous study (Berechman and de Wit, 1996), we already explored the potential of 
Amsterdam Airport Schiphol of becoming the major West-European hub, once European 
aviation markets are deregulated. A major hindrance of that study was the use of a single hub- 
and-spoke network. For example that model could not analyze the viability of different 
combinations of European hubs within a multiple hub network of alternative airline alliances. 
In this study we have formulated the model of a multi-hub network where two West-European 
airports are used for inter-continental and intra-European travel to enable a more realistic 
analysis of hub choice. 
Like the previous one also this multi-hub model is primarily used to assess the potential 
ability of Amsterdam Airport Schiphol for becoming a major West-European hub. Thus in 
particular the policy tests focus on this airport in a double hub network. 
2. The Economic Model and Mathematical Program 
In this section we first describe the microeconomic model on which the mathematical program 
is based. 
2. I The Economic Model 
The observed phenomenon of increased hubbing, following the USA aviation market 
deregulation, has long been the subject of in-depth analysis in the germane literature. In 
general, the question is under what conditions will an airline’s profit be greater when it uses a 
Hub and Spoke (HS) network vs. a Fully Connected (FC) network. The advantages of the HS 
network structure can be divided into three main branches (see Berechman and de Wit, 1996, 
for a detailed analysis): 
Cost Economies: A number of authors have argued that cost considerations, mainly 
economies of aircraft size coupled with scope economies, underlie the intensified use of HS 
networks. 
Demand-Side Eflects: Demand-side effects are another argument to explain the 
intensified use of HS network following deregulation. Two types of explanation fall under this 
approach: (a) demand elasticities relative to aidare and travel time; and (b) product 
differentiation in departure times. 
Market Dominance: analysis shows that given the proper conditions the incumbent 
airline will operate a HS network when faced with the threat of entry, thus successfhlly 
obstructing entry. 
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In this study we adopt all three types of explanation by considering a hypothetical airline, 
which operates in a deregulated market, and which strives to maximize profits and gain 
market dominance by structuring its network as a hub-and-spoke. In doing so it takes 
advantage of demand and network cost economies. On each route it sets airfare, output level 
(number of passengers and frequency), and employs aircraft capacity in a way that deters entry 
by potential rival airlines. In structuring its HS network, the airline chooses as main hubs 
those airports which best contribute to its profits. The analytical model, which is embedded in 
the simulation model, explicitly contains all these elements. 
It should be re-emphasized however, that in this study we do not regard a pure HS network. 
Instead, we consider two main hubs that can serve as intercontinental gateway hubs, intra- 
European hubs, or both. (See for example figure 1 and 2). 
On the demand side, the utility of a business or non-business passenger traveling on the route 
from node i to node j is based on the airfare, frequency of flights and whether or not the flight 
is direct or indirect. If a passenger is flying indirectly, he or she must fly from node i to node j 
via one or two hubs because no direct link exists in the network configuration chosen. The 
utility is then measured according to the lowest frequency along any one of the maximal three 
legs of the route required ( i+hubl +hub2 + j ) .  As can be seen from the theoretical model 
(Berechman et al, 1995), this ensures non-entry of airlines that may consider providing a 
direct service between two nodes, at present unconnected, since the airfare paid will be low 
enough to render entry uneconomical. 
I 2 3 
It is assumed that the airline’s operating cost function can be defined as a standard CES 
function. This class of function is general enough to capture the cost of operating different 
types of networks with a varying number of routes and layout patterns. It is monotonically 
increasing and exhibits increasing returns. This ensures scale economies in that as output 
(frequency, or ACM per week) increases, the cost per flight decreases. Therefore it is 
worthwhile increasing frequency in a HS system in order to deter entry into the marketplace 
by carriers attempting to provide a direct service from i to j, where this route does not 
presently exist. 
Additional costs result from payments made by the airline to the airports in the form of 
landing and passenger charges. The landing charges (LC) are paid to the arrival airport and are 
based on the maximum take-off weight of the aircraft size. The LC per route is computed by 
multiplying the Maximum Take-Off Weight of the aircraft size chosen, by the cost per ton of 
landing at the specific airport, by the frequency per week. The passenger charges (PC) are paid 
to the departure airport for each passenger carried. Two passenger charges have been 
included: the full tariff paid at the first departure airport and a transfer charge paid at 
subsequent hubs, when the passenger is carried on two or more legs to reach her destination. 
This pricing system is in line with the present rules of most international airports. Since there 
are many different types of charges, the LC and PC have been modified to include other 
relevant charges such as night charges and noise charges etc. and will be referred to as landing 
related and passenger related charges. 
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The Airline’s Objective Function: Given a particular hub airport, the airline’s objective 
function consists of the revenue the airline earns fiom passengers that travel directly to their 
destination and are therefore willing to pay an additional charge, and those that travel via the 
hub. The costs defined in the objective function include the operational cost function and 
landing and passenger related charges at this hub. The profit function is thus defined as: 
Profit Function = Revenue Function 
- Operating Costs Function - Landing Charges 
- Passenger Charges 
Recall that in this analysis we consider networks with two primary hubs. Therefore, the 
optimization model produces a solution to the profit function in terms of the potential 
profitability of the network with these hubs. By repeating the analysis for all possible 
networks the model sets the one with the highest level of profits to equal 100 and 
subsequently, ranks all other networks accordingly. I 
2.2. Mathematical Program 
The mathematical program consists of the above-mentioned objective function and four types 
of constraints that have been included in the program as follows: 
Type I :  Aircrafr Capacity Constraint 
This restricts the size of the aircraft to a minimum and a maximum number of seats. 
Type 2: Airport Capacity 
Airport capacity in terms of aircraft movements per unit of time (e.g. ACM per week) is 
affected by three components; runway, terminal and apron capacity. Runway capacity proved 
to be the most binding restriction in all cases, consequently other constraint types were 
redundant. 
Type 3: Load Factor Minimal Capacity 
This constraint requires a minimum percentage of seats filled (load factor) at all times, since 
the industry has an accepted minimal level, below which the airline will not break even. 
Type 4: Network Constraint 
The last set of constraints requires all frequency levels to be positive, ensuring that all nodes 
are connected in the network configuration specified. 
The algorithm that solves the mathematical program searches for a solution using a 
modification of Goldfarb’s conjugate-gradient projection algorithm for a non-linear objective 
hc t ion  with linear constraints. The algorithm has been modified to deal with a set of non- 
’ The choice of a network (thus hubs) is also based on the quality level of these hubs to indicate additional costs 
associated with the use of these airports (e.g., costs due to delays, congestion and handling).. Therefore, 
schematically the ranking of a network is: 
Network Ranking = Profitability Rank + Quality Score of Hub 1 and of Hub 2 
Analysis of this subject is beyond the scope of this study and is the main theme of a follow-up study. 
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linear constraints that require the load factor to be above a certain percentage in a feasible 
solution. (Adler et al., 1996). 
3. Network Structure 
In this study two internodal demand matrices, one for business and one for non-business, have 
been composed for 18 major European airports (resulting in 16 routes to be assigned to the 
two airports selected as hubs), a U.S. airport JFK and a Far-East airport NRT. We assume 
that all North-Atlantic traffic is aggregated into one international route (i.e. all North- 
American departures first fly to New York and then to a West-European hub). Similarly all 
Far-East routes are first connected to Tokyo and then to a West-European hub. In the 
simulation model it is possible to distribute the 2 inter-continental and the 16 European routes 
in any order (e.g. the two international routes to one hub and the 16 European airports evenly 
distributed between the two hubs), though a geographical distribution seems most sensible 
(see Figures 1 and 2). 
So the structure of the network is determined by three factors: a) the location of the major 
hubs; b) the number of intra-European routes and inter-continental routes that are connected to 
each hub; c) the allocation of European routes between the hubs. In this analysis we 
distinguish between two types of hub: a gateway-hub and a Euro-hub. A gateway hub is a 
point of transfer between inter-continental routes and intra-European routes. In this regard, a 
gateway hub has a feeder function by feeding the intra-European network with inter- 
continental passengers (e.g. long-haul: New York = Amsterdam - Zurich), vice versa. A 
Euro-hub, is a transfer point connecting short-haul to short-haul routes inside Europe. The 
same airport can, of course, serve the two functions but what counts is the proportion of trips 
that are long- or short-haul. 
Figure 1 shows a base case where all 16 European routes are distributed between an 
intercontinental hub (e.g. London) and an intra-European hub (e.g. Milan) whereby all North- 
Atlantic and Far-East international routes go to London. The division of the European routes 
is geographically based, Le., all airports east of Milan are linked to Milan whereas all airports 
west of Milan with London. A shuttle service links the main two hubs. 
Figure 2 shows a case where each hub connects with one international route (North-Atlantic 
with London and Far-East with Milan). 
4. Base Run Simulation 
Above we have defined a network by its main hubs and by the distribution of international and 
intra-European routes between these hubs. It should be understood that the simulation model 
is flexible enough to handle any assumed network configuration. The ones described below 
serve mainly as examples. 
We begin by presenting the results from, what we call, the “base run simulation”. The choice 
of the following 13 networks in this base run simulation was made on the grounds that airlines 
’ AMs, ARN, ATH, BCN. BRU, CDG, CPH, FBU, FCO, FRA, GVA, LHR, LM,  MAD, MAN, MUC, VIE, 
ZRH. 
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that use these hubs are potential alliances and that from geographical and demand 
considerations it is useful to distribute the intra-European routes as in the networks below. In 
each case, the 16 European routes have been split evenly between the two designated hubs, 
based on geographical considerations (distance to nearest hub). The two international routes 
are allocated to one hub which represents the international gateway (the one chosen provides 
the airline with the highest ~rofits)~.  The key parameters to notice are the potential profits of 
the (hypothetical) airline from using a particular network and the relative ranking of this 
network. Profits or losses to an airport are also noted. In some cases, however, these profits 
are from ACM and PAX related income and costs only as no information is available on the 
fixed income and costs of a particular airport. It is important to emphasize that it is not 
possible to attribute any “real-world” meaning to the numerical results from the simulations 
which stem from theoretical conditions of network choice and market structure under 
complete deregulation. 
In this section we report only principal results from the base-run simulation. Two main 
conclusions can be derived from the results of table 1. First, the networks which contain 
London (Heathrow) as one of their hubs rank the highest in terms of airline’s potential profits. 
In this base run simulation, the choice of London (LHR) and Rome (FCO) as the main hubs 
proves to be potentially the most profitable one (potential profit rank = 100). Amsterdam 
receives second ranking only when it is part of the network that includes London (potential 
profit rank = 86). 
A second conclusion is that when an airline designs a profitable network, the hubs in this 
network do not necessarily earn positive profits. For example, in the case of the London 
(LHR) and Rome (FCO) network, which earn the airline the highest potential profits, Rome 
airport suffers a loss. Apparently, what is good for the airline is not necessarily good for the 
airports. The question, what can an airport do in order to increase its use without suffering a 
loss, will be further explored in policy analysis section. 
5. Policy Tests 
5.1. Objectives of Policy Tests 
There are two main objectives for the policy tests. The first is to examine the network choice 
and performance of airlines and of airports under varying external conditions. The second 
objective is to determine optimal policy for Amsterdam airport Schiphol with respect to traffic 
and financial performance. 
In terms of the simulation model, attainment of the first objective requires that we introduce 
into the program changes in basic demand and operating conditions and, subsequently, a 
comparison of the model’s results with those obtained from the base run. Attainment of the 
second objective requires a search process by which the best combination of policy means 
available to Schiphol (e.g. change in ACM and PAX charges) is identified. 
One might expect that the gateway hub will serve all 16 European routes due to inter Gateway-European 
transfer flows. We have thus run these networks on the basis of demand considerations alone. The results were 
quite similar in terms of profit to the airline. 
Table 1. Summary of the Results from the Base Run Simulation 
Potential Profit in 5 ' s  routes assigned Relative Position 
- to airline 
hub 1 - to hub 1 
hub 2 - to hub 2 
Network - to hub 1 - to hub 2 
airline 
ZRB 
AMs 
airline 
FRA 
nm 
airline 
MAD 
AMs 
airline 
LBR 
Fco 
airline 
Hx) 
AHS 
Airline 
BRU 
ZRB 
Airline 
CPH 
CDC 
Airline 
CPH 
mA 
Airline 
CPH 
)pLD 
Airline 
LHR 
BRU 
Airline 
LBR 
mA 
Airline 
ax 
FCO 
Air 1 ine 
LHR 
Aus 
22524964 
4120282 
826803 
30740134 
-11436754 
1865857 
38417272 
1760099 
896383 
92710360 
3361255 
-13523035 
48660468 
-9109776 
1933525 
9087265 
4328177 
3494701 
40734660 
1541480 
-1829261 
1102184 6 
3117824 
-14378592 
33637388 
1876608 
2359777 
61958164 
1924944 
1684258 
69006952 
1895986 
-15216546 
66057220 
-1982632 
-15034719 
79428896 
3047660 
-1294053 
24 
Euro: 9 Interc'l: 0 
Euro: 9 Intcrc'l: 2 
33 
Euro: 9 Interc'l: 2 
Euro: 9 Interc'l: 0 
Euro: 9 Interc'l: 0 
~uro: 9 Interc'l: 2 
Euro: 9 Interc'l: 2 
Euro: 9 Intcrc'l: 0 
~uro: 9 Interc'l: 0 
~uro: 9 Interc'l: 2 
Euro: 9 Interc'l: 2 
Euro: 9 Intcrc'l: 0 
Euro: 9 Interc'l: 0 
Euro: 9 Interc'l: 2 
Euro: 9 Interc'l: 0 
Euro: 9 Interc'l: 2 
Euro: 9 Interc'l: 0 
Euro: 9 Interc'l: 2 
4 1  
100 
52 
10  
4 4  
12 
36 
67 
Euro: 9 Interc'l: 2 
Euro: 9 Interc'l: 0 
74 
Euro: 9 Interc'l: 2 
Euro: 9 Intcrc'l: 0 
7 1  
Euro: 9 Interc'l: 2 
Euro: 9 Interc'l: 0 
86 
Euro: 9 Interc'l: 2 
Euro: 9 Interc'l: 0 
The following policy tests were performed: 
(A) effect of doubling demand; 
(B) effect of doubling demand and increasing airport capacity; 
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(C) effect of decreasing landing charges (at Schiphol); 
(D) effect of decreasing passenger charges (at Schiphol); 
(E) effect of a change in a mix of policies on Schiphol’s position; 
Two additional policy tests focused on the effects of changes in network structure on 
Schiphol’s position. 
(F) effect of splitting international routes; 
(G) effect of changing intra-European routes; 
In many of these tests the introduction of an exogenous change is also likely to affect the 
quality of airports from the point of view of airlines which, in turn, could affect their choice of 
a primary hub. Since in this study we did not model airlines’ reaction to changes in airport 
quality attributes, we disregard airports’ quality effects arising from these policy changes. As 
mentioned above, such an analysis is the subject of a follow-up study. Below we report the 
major findings from these policy tests. 
5.2. Policy Test Results 
A. Effect of Doubling Demand: the demand data used here represents approximately 45% of 
actual demand. The reason being that in Europe non-scheduled and charter operations 
constitute a very large proportion of total demand. In addition, in this study we have used only 
18 European airports (albeit the major ones), thereby not considering trips from smaller 
airports. To account for this discrepancy and to assess the effect of future growing demand we 
have doubled both the business and non-business demand matrices. Compared with the base- 
run the results show that while the network with London (LHR) - Rome (FCO) as its hubs still 
ranks the highest, other networks become a viable option. Thus, for example, whereas in the 
base- run London (LHR) - Brussels (BRU) ranked fifth after London (LHR) - Rome (FCO), 
now it ranks second. On the other hand, the network London (LHR) - Amsterdam (AMS) 
which ranked second in the base-run is now down to fifth position. Apparently, as demand 
increases the strategic position of other airports (such as Brussels in combination with 
London) becomes an attractive option for airlines. This conclusion should be qualified, 
however, as we did not consider the effect of greater demand on congestion and delays, thus 
on the attractiveness of airports from airlines’ viewpoint. 
B. Effect of Doubling Demand and Increasing Aimort Cauacitv: It can be seen from the 
doubled demand test results that certain airports are used to their full capacity. One solution is 
to expand runway capacity. Of the 5 major airports in our study, London (LHR) and Frankfurt 
are unlikely to see any increase in runway capacity. Amsterdam, Paris (CDG) and possibly 
Brussels, can expect such a development4. Thus, in this policy test the runway capacity of 
these 3 airports is increased according to their projected capacity per week in the year 2000 
(SRI, 1991) as follows: 
‘ In cases where it is not possible to increase capacity the solutions to congestion will be either decline in service 
level (e.g. longer delays) or higher charges, or both. 
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Hub Original Runway Runway Capacity 
Aimort Capacity for the year 2000 
Amsterdam 1 1,424 15,120 
Brussels 7,392 10,080 
Charles de Gaulle 12,096 12,600 
The main conclusion fiom this analysis is that compared with the previous test (A) the 
position of Amsterdam will not improve while that of Paris (CDG) will (compare, for 
example the positions of CDG - FCO and LHR - AMs in tests A and B). The profit level of 
different networks might change as well but in evaluating these results it should be point out 
that we did not account for the capital costs of these capacity development projects and their 
possible effect on airlines’ costs. 
C. Effect of Decreasing Landing Charges (at SchiDhol): In this study we have lumped all 
charges into two main categories: landing or Aircraft Movement (ACM) and Passengers 
(PAX) charges. In general, all charges need to be approved by governmental authorities thus, 
except for inflation adjustments, the margins for a change are rather limited. However, as 
explained above, our objective is to examine the effect of charges on network structure and 
the choice of a particular hub, independent of how applicable is this policy at present. To that 
end, in this test we reduce ACM charges at Schiphol by 15 percent. Compared with the base- 
run the results from this test indicate no effect on Schiphol‘s ranking (LHR - AMS is second 
place in both cases) with a slight improvement in potential profits for airlines (due to the drop 
in charge costs). 
D. Effect of Decreasing Passenger Charges (at Schiuhol): In the following policy test we have 
decreased Schiphol’s passenger related (PAX) charges, for both transfer and non-transfer 
passengers, by 15%. The results show that decreasing PAX charges has little to no effect on 
the outcomes (Schiphol’s ranking and airlines’ profits). Compared with the results of test C, 
decreasing Schiphol’s landing charges by 15% has a greater impact on the airlines’ profits 
than a decrease of PAX charges of a similar magnitude. In either case, decreasing charges has 
no effect on the ranking of preferable networks. 
E. Effect of a Change in a Mix of Policies on SchiDhol’s Position: In this test we examined the 
combined effect of completely eliminating all charges at Schiphol (Le., ACM and PAX 
charges are set to zero) while concurrently doubling demand everywhere. The main 
conclusion fiom this test is that demand has a much greater impact on network ranking and 
profitability than charges have. Compared with the results of test A, the decline in Schiphol’s 
charges has improved the airline’s level of potential profits but did not affect its relative 
ranking. 
F. Effect of Sulittinp International Routes: In the base case analysis the two international 
routes (New York (JFK) and Tokyo (NRT)) are connected to one hub (the European gateway 
hub, e.g., London) while the other airport serves as an intra-European main hub. In this case 
each of the two hubs is connected to one of the two international hubs in order to determine 
the effect on potential profits and network ranking. The results (shown in Appendix F) imply 
that, based on potential profits, the splitting of the international routes reduces overall 
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profitability, compared with the base-run’s results. Hence, fiom this perspective this is not a 
preferable approach. From network ranking point of view the network London (LHR) 
connected to JFK and Amsterdam (AMs) connected to NRT is superior (in terms of potential 
profits) to the network London (LHR) connected to JFK and Rome (FCO) connected to NRT 
which seems, from geographical viewpoint, to be the more logical one (than LHR connected 
to Tokyo and FCO connected to New York). 
Test Type 
I Base Run 
G. Effect of ChanPing Intra-EuroDean Routes: In the base case analysis each of the two main 
hubs is connected to 9 intra-European routes. The objective of this test is to ascertain whether 
a different split of these routes will affect potential profitability and ranking. Hence, in this 
run, the European domestic routes are alternately split 7 to 11 between the two European hubs 
(as well as between the two international routes). Compared with the base-run results, in 
general, profit level has been increased after this split. For example LHR - FCO weekly 
potential profit level has risen fiom $92.7 million in the base-run to $100.5 million. In this 
regard this policy is a preferable one. From network ranking viewpoint, Schiphol’s position is 
not improved as another network, London (LHR) - Fmnkfiut (FRA) has a higher ranking. It 
is possible, of course, to test for any other routes’ split to find out whether Schiphol’s position 
can indeed be considerably improved. 
Airline’s Best Network Choice Schiphol’ Best Position 
LHR FCO 100 LHR AMS 86 2 
Hubs Rank Hubs Rank Position 
LHR FCO 100 FCO AMS 77 4 A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
F 
Doubling Demand 
Doubling Demand and 
Increasing Airport Capacity 
Decreasing Schiphol’s 
Landing Charges 
Decreasing Schiphol’s 
Passengers Charges 
Mix of Policies 
Splitting International 
Routes 
LHR FCO 
LHR FCO 
100 FCO AMS 76 5 
100 LHR AMS 87 2 
:ount possible changes in the quality level of airports resulting from 
20 while ranking fmt, is somewhat doubtful fiom geographical 
cted to Tokyo (NRT) and FCO to be connected to New York (JFK) 
LHR FCO 
LHR FCO 
LHR FCO 
LHR FCO 
5.3. Summary of The Policy Tests 
100 LHR AMS 86 2 
100 FCO AMS 91 4 
97 LHR AMS 97 2 
100 LHR AMS 80 3 
As the focus of this study is on the effect of alternative policies on airlines’ choice of best 
network (in terms of primary hubs) and on the position of Amsterdam (Schiphol) airport, the 
following table summarizes the main results from the above policy analyses. 
G Changing Intra-European 
Routes 
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Several conclusions can be drawn from these results. First, the combination of London (LHR) 
and Rome (FCO) airports appears to be superior, in t e r n  of its potential ability to generate 
profits for airlines, under all policy test conditions (save for the implausible case of test F). 
This is mainly due to the very strong position of London’s Heathrow airport in Europe and the 
effective geographical division of European routes between London and Rome. 
The second conclusion is that the dominant factor affecting potential profitability and ranking 
of airports are actual demand patterns. Given demand elasticities, when more passengers use 
an airport as their origin or destination airport, the greater is the propensity of airlines to use 
this airport as their primary hub. It further seems that the demand factor supersedes many 
possible policy options like reducing landing and passenger charges. As suggested by the 
results of test A, if demand for air travel will indeed grow, (e.g., due to reduction in aidare 
following the European aviation deregulation), Schiphol’s position is likely to decline as other 
airports, like Brussels and Paris (CDG), are more likely to be selected by airlines as their 
primary European hubs. This tendency will be further intensified if these other airports will 
also increase their runway capacity (see results of test B). A plausible corollary to this 
conclusion is that if Schiphol airport wishes to improve its relative position it needs to 
increase demand for its services relative to other airports. One sensible way of doing so is by 
expanding its catchment area, for example, by improving rail and bus link services to it. 
A third conclusion is that the intercontinental linkages of an airport play an important role in 
determining its relative position. This can be seen from the results of test F which indicate that 
the combination of London (linked to New York (JFK)) and Amsterdam (linked to Tokyo 
(NRT)) is a viable alternative to the London-Rome combination. In general, it is the airlines 
which decide on the structure of their network and connectivity to international hubs. 
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ABSTRACT Increasing the scale of hub operations at major airports has led to concerns 
about congestion at excessively large hubs. In this paper we estimate the marginal cost of 
adding spokes to an existing hub network. We observe entryhon-entry decisions on potential 
spokes &om existing hubs, and estimate both a variable profit function for providing service 
in markets using that spoke as well as the fixed costs of providing service to the spoke. We 
let the fixed costs depend upon the scale of operations at the hub, and find the hub size at 
which spoke service costs are minimized. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
One legacy of airline deregulation has been an increased reliance upon hub-and-spoke 
networks among national c d e r s .  By drastically reducing the number of flights required to 
accommodate a set of endpoints, hubs have been the source of massive scale and scope 
economies. A benefit of the hub-and-spoke system is service to smaller markets where direct 
service to a variety of destinations is cost prohibitive, yet exclusive service to a nearby hub 
is not; this service enables travelers from small markets to access a carrier’s entire network. 
While consumers benefit from spacial accessibility resulting from large networks, most 
national carriers reported excessive losses during the early 1990s. These losses threaten 
service to numerous small markets. Given the proliferation of hubs and the recent losses 
incurred within the airline industry, it is timely and appropriate to identify the minimum and 
maximum efficiency scales of both hubs and their associated networks. 
We focus on identifying the incremental costs of increasing the number of spokes 
served by a single hub. This structure may be determined by examining the additional profits 
gained from offering service to smaller airports and connecting those airports to an entire 
network via a central hub. We do not measure profits explicitly. Rather, we use entry and 
exit decisions as a signal of profitability. Our approach is innovative in inferring spoke-level 
fixed costs from entry and exit decisions. 
The optimal structure for an air carrier depends on both the incremental costs 
associated with each spoke and the fixed costs of operating a hub. Two extreme cases may 
be considered. If carrying traffic over long spokes is costly, or if the average “cost- 
minimizing” hub contains only a small number of spokes, then the efficient network structure 
involves many small hubs. This type of network would more likely evolve when congestion 
costs are high. Conversely, if the fixed costs associated with hubs are high, or if carrying 
spoke traffc is inexpensive, then an efficient network will involve a few large hubs with 
numerous spokes. Some anecdotal evidence suggests that moving toward larger hubs is the 
more efficient network structure for airline markets.’ However, a fundamental issue in 
building an assessment of the relative efficiency of large and small hubs lies in the 
determination of costs. 
We use entry and exit decisions as a signal of profitability, since it is not 
straightforward to measure operating costs with cost data.? First, we infer both the profits 
earned by carrying traffic along the network as well as the fixed costs associated with 
providing the entire network. The use of entry decisions to infer fixed costs was pioneered 
by Bresnahan and Reiss (1987) and has been applied to airlines by Reiss and Spiller (1 989), 
, 
’ This conclusion is based upon the recent consolidation of American Airlines. 
’ An entire literature has evolved with respect to allocating costs among routes, spokes, etc. For details 
see Caves, Christianson and Tretheway (1984), Cornwell, Schmidt and Sickles. (1990) etc. 
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Beny (1 992), and Brueckner and Spiller (1 994). Second, we combine the use of entry as a 
signal of costs and profitability with the cost disaggregation of Brueckner and Spiller, to 
directly measure the costs associated with adding a spoke to an existing hub-and-spoke 
network. This second innovative step is crucial in identifying the optimal network structure. 
Our model of entry, unlike previous models, recognizes that demand is based on city- 
pair markets, not on service along spokes. We incorporate the many four-segment markets 
(or routes) a carrier simultaneously enters when adding a spoke. Adding a flight along a 
spoke between two cities enables the carrier to enter any four segment city-pair market that 
is accessible fiom either endpoint. Demand for any route depends upon the total distance, 
competition, and demographic factors. Costs depend on both the variable costs associated 
with providing service in the relevant city-pair markets, plus the fixed costs of adding the 
additional spoke to the hub airport. Thus choice of entry or exit depends on the variable 
profits for the change in a network versus the associated fixed costs of operating that 
particular spoke. 
Like Brueckner and Spiller (1 994) we measure costs as a function of flights between 
city pairs. Because the choice of entry or exit depends upon the incremental revenue of entry 
versus the associated incremental cost of offering service on a particular spoke, we measure 
the total effect of entry or exit on the carrier’s network-wide profits. We combine three data 
sets (route variables, route-carrier variables, and spoke variables) into a maximum likelihood 
specification where entryhon-entry is the dependent variable. From our model, we recover 
a cost specification for operating spokes through hub cities, and test that specification for 
scale economies. 
The remainder of paper is organized as follows: The next section contains a 
description of the hub-and-spoke system and provides motivation for our research. Our 
methodology, including a description of our technique and our data, comprises the third 
section. Results fiom our model and concluding remarks are included in the fourth and fifth 
sections, respectively. 
2. THE HUB-AND-SPOKE SYSTEM 
During airline economic regulation, tight government control over route entry resulted in a 
“linear” structure for national carriers. Airlines were required to petition the Civil 
Aeronautics Board (CAB) if they desired entry into a given route and often had to justify the 
need for additional service to gain such entry. Conversely, carriers were required to provide 
service to many smaller, less lucrative markets. While the CAB was effective in providing 
service to small markets, travel to and fiom these airports often involved numerous stops and 
inter-line ~onnections.~ Proponents of regulation expected small airports to suffer a loss of 
’ When making an inter-line connection, the passenger changes airlines at some point during the trip and 
recheck in himself and his luggage. 
Ross and Schmidt - Page 3 
service without government protection. This prediction was based on the linear route 
structure imposed by regulation. 
Since deregulation, we have observed a curiously different outcome. The linear route 
structure imposed by the CAB was quickly abandoned by national carriers in favor of a hub- 
and-spoke (H&S) system! The H&S system has been used in other modes of transportation, 
such as busing, rail, and subway; it was a natural progression for airlines. A noted advantage 
in H&S is the cost savings generated from more efficient aircraft utilization. These savings 
generally offset the cost increases that are associated with additional ascents and descents, 
and circuitous routing. These cost savings have allowed many small markets to maintain a 
profitable niche in airline networks and driven carriers to extend their networks even further.’ 
The dominance of the H&S system has revolutionized the way carriers offer service. 
Two key aspects of this revolution are in flight composition and frequency of service. 
Because H&S systems allow passengers, from a variety of origins, travel to the entire 
network of destinations via a hub, a spoke is used by all passengers originating at the spoke 
regardless of their intended destinatiom6 Given this increased spoke usage, airlines offer 
more frequent service to accommodate passengers requiring connecting service at various 
times. Increased frequency implies a greater dependence on smaller aircraft and better 
utilization of larger aircraft between hubs and other large markets. The end result is larger, 
non-uniform fleets of aircraft. 
The economic consequences of H&S paradoxically include both heightened 
competition and the market power associated with hub dominance. Competition has 
increased on a network scale. Prior to deregulation, carriers were restricted in the markets 
they could enter; since deregulation, entry is easier, although not free, and carriers are able 
to use their H&S networks to link all entered markets to all others. Given the increased 
variety in routes offered by all carriers, it is inevitable that carriers will begin to compete for 
customers on previously monopolized routes. Conversely, Borenstein (1 989) has shown 
significant market power associated with hub dominance. A case in point is the Charlotte, 
NC hub dominated by USAir. USAir uses its USAir express service to provide spoke 
service to several dozen small markets within a few hundred miles of Charlotte. For most 
Under H&S airplanes from several points of origin arrive at a central hub where passengers change 
planes to travel to their intended destinations. 
’ For extensive details on the transition from linear to hub-and-spoke systems in the airline industry, see 
Oum and Tretheway (1990). 
This implies an absolute increase in spacial accessibility due to the availability of network service from 
their local airports. 
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of these markets, USAir express is the only local link to a national network.’ American 
Airlines attempted to introduce competition from a “mini-hub‘’ at RaleigDurham (RDU). 
However, after several years of poor response American left these smaller markets and sold 
much of its RDU business to Midway Airlines. Therefore, although the H&S system has led 
to intense competition among national carriers for heavily traveled routes, monopolized 
pockets have become an important factor in maintaining profitable service to smaller markets 
and the entire network.* 
3. METHODOLOGY 
In the following subsection, we use various terms to describe network configurations 
for supply and demand purposes. A hub is a centrally located airport serving as an 
intermediate point between numerous outlying cities. A spoke is a connection between a 
hub city and an endpoint city. Airlines fly along spokes, connected to their hubs, to feed 
traffic into their networks. A route is a connection between one outlying city and another 
reached via a hub; that is, each route contains two spokes attached to the same hub. 
Passengers fly along routes; the routes an airline can serve depend on the spokes it flies. A 
market is a pair of endpoint cities; each market contains one route for each possible hub by 
which a passenger can travel between the outlying cities. 
3.1. Model 
In order to provide service to a market, an airline must operate two spokes connecting the 
origin city and destination city to its network via one of its hub cities. We specifically define 
a route as two endpoints connected by a hub. Following Brueckner and Spiller (1 994), we 
disaggregate the costs into two components--the fixed costs of providing the hub, and the 
incremental cost of providing service along each spoke. We then break down the 
incremental costs of serving each spoke into a fixed cost of serving the spoke, and the 
variable costs of carrying passengers along that spoke. Brueckner and Spiller examine the 
marginal costs of carrying passengers to test for economies of density; in contrast, we focus 
on the fixed (with regard to network traffic) costs of adding the spoke into the hub. We 
define spoke costs between an outlying city and the hub as 
c, =Z*P , 
’ Access to other national networks would require travel to other mid-sized airports such as 
RaleighDurham, Nashville, or Norfolk. 
* An alternative representation of this point may be found in Hayes and Ross (1996). Hayes ar?d Ross 
note that the financially viable national carriers tend to offer an extensive nehvork of service, but carefully 
protect dominated routes. 
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where Ci represents the cost of operating spoke i ,  Xis a set of exogenous variables describing 
cost conditions at the outlying city and at the hub, and p is a vector of parameters. If a 
carrier does not provide spoke service to some outlying city, it cannot provide route service 
between that city and any other city on the airline’s network. However, providing spoke 
service, allows service on any four-leg routes in the network (as well as the two-leg route 
between the outlying city and the hub). 
When the airline incurs the fixed costs of providing the sppoke, it gains the ability 
to provide service to four-segment routes that connect to the network along that spoke. In 
serving the network of routes, the airline will incur traffic costs but will also earn revenue 
from additional tr&ic. Profits earned by serving a given route are 
where n is the airline’s profitability from routej via spoke i. 2, is a set of exogenous 
variables describing cost conditions and demand for tickets between the two endpoints; y is 
a vector of parameters; and E is an error term whose distribution is described below. The 
airline will choose to serve those routes for which profits are positive. For any spoke i ,  let 
S, be the set of all routes for which such profits are positive. Then the airline’s incremental 
profits for serving spoke i are given by 
n;=c,n, - Ci.9 (3) 
If incremental spoke profits are positive, then the airline will choose to provide service in 
spoke i and will serve those routes in the set Si. The carrier will not serve those routes for 
which incremental route profits are negative, even after the costs of providing spoke i are 
paid; that is, the routes outside the set S,. If incremental spoke profits are negative, then the 
carrier will not provide service on the spoke nor any of the routes which include that spoke. 
The incremental profit fiom serving a route depends upon the extent of competition 
fiom other airlines serving the same market, and on the level of product differentiation 
between them. This issue was addressed by Berry (1992). Following his approach, we 
decompose the error term in the profit equation (2). 
cy = h m ,  W,a)u + uii (4) 
This is similar to Brueckner and Spiller, p. 396. 
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N is the number of airlines serving the market; W is a set of variables describing the product 
differentiation between those airlines which affect this airline’s share of the market; a is a 
vector of parameters; and the error u is independent of N and distributed Normal(O,l).’o 
After substituting, the final form of the incremental route profit function is 
After rearranging to collect error terms, the incremental spoke profit h c t i o n  is given by 
The airline enters the spoke if ni is positive and does not enter if it is negative. l 1  
Io Berry allows for the possibility that there is product differentiation which is observed by airlines and 
customers, but unobserved by econometricians. He thus allows the h() function to contain a second, carrier- 
specific error term whose distribution may be fm-specific and may be correlated with E. The 
identification of the model is made complicated by the presence of two error terms, possibly correlated, 
whose joint distribution depends on the number of carriers already serving the market. Berry suggests four 
different strategies for identifying the model. 
1) Assume that profits are constant with respect to N, thus removing the correlation between e and N from 
the model. 
2) Berry himself restricts consideration to markets served by two or fewer carriers, and reduces the 
problem of the joint distribution of error terms to one which is computationally tractable. This solution is 
not suitable to our problem. In order to consider the effect of spoke costs on entry we must consider all 
routes served along that spoke, regardless of the number of carriers which serve the relevant markets. 
3) Suppress the carrier-specific error requiring the addition of sufficient W variables to explicitly account 
for product differentiation. While airlines are product differentiated in many ways, we believe that the 
variables we include in W are sufficient to measure the effect of product differentiation on profitability. 
We adopt this method. As a result, the entry game between the carriers serving this market uniquely 
determines the number of f m s  serving the market, but not their identities (see Berry for details). We 
therefore condition our draws for E on the equilbrium having the proper number of firms, since that is what 
can be inferred from the distribution of E, not whether any specific fm enters or not. 
4) Assume that f m s  enter in order of decreasing profitability, and that entry decisions are binding. Then 
one need consider the fm-specific error of the last f m ,  rather than one for every potential entrant. An 
alternative representation of this point may be found in Hayes and Ross (1996). Hayes and Ross note that 
the financially viable national carriers tend to offer an extensive network of service, but carefully protect 
dominated routes. 
” The above description may not apply to some markets where alternate hubs are available for serving 
the markets in question. In that case, the airline serving the spoke may be able to make some profits in 
some of the affected markets even if it chooses not to serve the spoke in question; adding service to the 
spoke in question may cause the airline to forego profits on passengers that are currently flying between the 
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. .  . .  stirnation S trateov 
As in a probit model, we maximize the likelihood of observed entry and non-entry decisions 
as a function of our parameters. However, our estimation is complicated by two 
distinguishing features. First, the distribution depends of E upon the number of competitors 
‘in each of the markets served by a particular spoke. Second, when an airline does enter a 
spoke, we know which routes it chooses to serve and which routes it chooses not to serve. 
This entry decision provides useful information regarding the y parameters. 
To address the peculiarities of our model, we use numerical integration to estimate 
its parameters. For every spoke in the data set, we estimate the likelihood that the airline 
chooses the entryho entry decision we observe by the following procedure: 
1) In each route served by that spoke, we draw a value, e ,  for cd which is consistent with 
the known information about how many other carriers serve the market, and with the airline’s 
actual decision to serve that route if we observe it (that is, if the airline did enter the spoke 
in question). 
2) Based upon e,, we calculate the airline’s profit on that route fiom equation (5). If the 
airline did enter the spoke, we know for which routes the airline chose to provide service. 
Our calculated route profits will be positive if they did and negative if they did not (due to 
the conditioning in step 1). If the route profit is negative, we set it to zero, since the airline 
will not enter this route even if they do enter the spoke. If the airline did not enter the spoke, 
then our random draws can produce either positive route variable profits (route entry) or 
negative route variable profits (route non-entry), since we do not observe whether the airline 
chooses to serve that route or not if it had entered the spoke. Since the airline would not 
serve a route predicted to offer negative variable profits, we set zero profits in that case also. 
3) We add the profits on each route together and subtract the additional costs of serving the 
spoke. We predict entry if the total spoke profits are positive, and non-entry if they are 
negative. 
4) We repeat steps 1 to 3 a large number of times for each spoke, and take the fraction in 
which we predict entry as the probability of entry in that spoke. 
endpoint cities by means of a different hub. In such case the entry decision should be conditioned on 
marginal profit earned by serving the spoke, rather than the total. For the current version of the paper we 
have restricted ourselves to airlines and spokes where no alternative hub is available and therefore the 
profits the airline will earn, in the relevant markets, by not entering the given spoke is known to be zero. 
We may expand the data sample to include other markets in which the marginal profit characterization will 
be relevant in a future version of this paper. 
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When entry is not observed, we do not know which routes the airline would serve if 
it chose to serve the spoke. However, we surmise profits for the whole spoke to be negative, 
and accordingly, the likelihood for the spoke is P r p ,  < 0). Conversely, when a spoke is 
served, we do know which routes the airline serves and which it does not serve. In the case 
of entry, the likelihood for the spoke is Pr(n, > 0, n, > 0 over SI, n, < 0 over 4,). We 
calculate the former likelihood by numeric integration without complication. Since the 
probability of any one trial having the correct pattern of routes served and not served is low, 
the latter likelihood is computationally intensive; therefore, numerous draws are required to 
accurately estimate the probability. A more efficient procedure is to decompose the 
probability of entry into P r v ,  > 0 I n, > 0 over SI, IT, < 0 over 4,) * Pr(l7, > 0 over SI, n, 
< 0 over -SI). The first term, a conditional probability of the decomposition, is computed 
numerically by drawing values of E, that are conditioned on n,,> 0 for routes where entry 
is observed, and on n, < 0 for routes where entry is not observed, as discussed above. The 
second term, a marginal probability, is computed using the normal distribution function. We 
multiply these two probabilities together to condition properly the likelihood estimates. 
3.3. Airline Data 
Adapting our empirical model to available airline data presents many challenges. We use 
airline presence data fiom the Department of Transportation's Origin and Destination Survey 
(DBlA) and the TlOO Domestic Segment Data for 1992 (T100).'* The DBlA provides 
revenue and number of passengers flying from ticket sales, leg by leg itinerary records for 
each ticket, and hub utilization information. The T100 provides plane usage, frequency of 
service, and fleet composition information. In addition to the data from the Department of 
Transportation, we incorporate gate information and demographics to describe hub 
dominance and demand, re~pective1y.l~ 
We chose the entire year of 1992 for several reasons. First, 1978 through 1988 was 
a period of massive restructuring in the airline industry with some 41 mergers (27 alone 
occurring between 1985 and 1988) and numerous bankruptcies. Such activity could easily 
complicate the identification of entry, non-entry, and competition. Therefore, we want to be 
(chronologically) as far away from this activity as our available data allow. Second, the 
TlOO is a valuable source of information which began in 1990.14 Third, we chose to utilize 
l2 The former data comprises a 10% sample of all domestic passenger itineraries and provides us with 
detailed information on routes of travel, hub utilization and revenue. The latter data source includes data 
from all non-stop flights and provides information on plane size and utilization, and flight frequency. 
I 3  We are indebted to Robin C. Sickles for demand characteristics and to Richard Butler for gate 
information. The demand characteristics are not included in this draft. 
l4 Another data source (Service Segment Data) provides similar information for earlier years. 
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an entire year to avoid seasonal fluctuations. Finally, much of the financial distress that 
rocked the airline industry in the very early 1990s led carriers to abandon unprofitable routes 
and discontinue service to small markets. By catching the tail end of this era, we hope to 
correctly label these abandoned routes as non-entry. 
A central issue to our estimation procedure is a comparison between entry and non- 
entry spokes. While collecting revenue and flight information about entry spokes is a 
straightforward process, the same is not true for the non-entry spokes. A non-entry spoke 
is the combination of a hub and an outlying airport that is not served through the hub. Our 
task is to find the potentially fruitful outlying airport. We find the fruitful airports by 
watching the behavior of (a) other carriers hubbing at the same hub, (b) other carriers 
hubbing near by, or (c ) the same carrier hubbing near by. Table 1 contains a list of our 
carrierhub combinations and the alternative carrierhubs we utilize to identify and infer 
revenue and flight information for non-entry routes. Table 2, showing summary statistics, 
exhibits an average value of .87 to the entry indicator. The low percentage of non-entry 
routes demonstrates that airline carriers have a tendency to “blanket the market” and, 
therefore, non-entry spokes are rare. 
The set of independent variables is composed of three subsets. The first subset of 
variables is spoke-carrier based. We include the total revenue associated with entry into a 
spoke, spoke distance, flight frequency and enplanement data, and the number of endpoints 
accessible fiom the hub. The second subset of variables is route-carrier based and provides 
information regarding overall flight distance, route revenue, and market share. The third 
subset is composed of route information focusing on endpoint demographics and the 
competitive environment of the route. Summary statistics for these variables are contained 
in Table 2 and detailed descriptions may be found in the Data Appendix. 
4. RESULTS 
Our preliminary results are based upon a limited number of variables and a 10% sample of 
our data set. In the spoke fixed costs X,*p (equation 1) we use two independent variables, 
TOTGATES, the total number of gates at the hub, and CARRGATES, the number of gates 
under the control of the carrier in question. In the route profits Z,*y ( equation 6 )  we use 
ROUTDIST, the distance along the route; we hope to add demographic information on 
demand in the near future. In the h,(N,W,a) function, we include log N, the number of 
carriers serving the route, NDEST, the number of destinations each carrier may reach from 
a spoke, and DISTRATIO, the ratio of distance of each carrier on the route to the distance 
of the competitor with the shortest path between the two endpoints.” The latter two 
variables capture heterogeneity in service between airlines. Airlines which serve more 
destinations are more attractive for frequent flyer programs, and should be more profitable: 
~_____  ~ 
I s  We include observations for all carriers flying a route in question. 
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airlines which take passengers far out of their way will have longer travel times and should 
- be less demanded, hence less profitable. 
The results of the estimation are: 
Route profits = -0.730 - 0.210e-4 * DISTRATIO + 3.26e-4 * NDEST 
- 0.044 * CARRDIST - 1.85 * log N 
and 
Spoke costs = -0.208 + 2.726 * TOTGATES + 0.136 * CARRGATES 
Log likelihood = -6612.973633 
We have not yet been able to calculate standard errors for these estimates, so we cannot 
determine their significance, but we can still draw some preliminary conclusions based on 
the signs of the estimates as long as the tentative nature of those conclusions is clear. First, 
we note that while spoke fixed costs are substantially higher at larger airports (those with 
more total gates), it does not make a great deal of difference how large the operations of the 
hubbing carrier are (because the coefficient on CARRGATES is considerably smaller than 
that on TOTGATES). This suggests that most of the incremental costs of adding a spoke to 
a hub are the physical costs of making the airport larger; if a spoke is added by switching 
gates from a non-hubbing airline to the hubbing airline, the incremental costs are quite small 
in relative terms. Indeed, they may be zero if the estimated coefficient turns out to be 
insignificant. This result suggests that there are decreasing returns (rising incremental costs) 
in making hubs larger, although the returns decrease more slowly, perhaps not at all, if the 
increase is achieved by giving the hubbing carrier a larger share of the existing gates at the 
airport rather than by making the airport larger. 
Second, the coefficient on ROUTDIST is negative. This is reasonable, since the costs of 
serving long routes, particularly fuel and the opportunity cost of pilot and crew time, are 
higher than those of serving short routes. Our current specification for distance is linear; 
however, if airlines have economies of hauling distance, the true relationship may be 
quadratic, with the ROUTDIST2 term being positive. We hope to test for this in future 
regressions. Third, the airline heterogeneity measures are taking the expected signs; NDEST 
is positive and DISTRATIO is negative. This gives us reason to believe that we have 
correctly controlled for demand heterogeneity between carriers in the profit hc t ion .  
Our next step is to add more variables to X,*p, specifically the number of spokes served 
by the airline, and to use a quadratic functional form to allow for the possibility that 
incremental spoke costs might fall, then rise as the size of the network increases. 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
As airlines continue to rely on hub and spoke networks to compete in an increasingly global 
market: economists and other researchers must weigh the costs and benefits associated with 
these networks. We add to a literature addressing these issues by evaluating the marginal 
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profitability of spokes within these networks. Our approach was innovative in several ways. 
First, we used entry as a signal of costs and profitability as did Berry. Second, we 
disaggregated costs as did Brueckner and Spiller, by directly measuring the fixed costs 
associated with adding a marginal spoke to an existing hub-and-spoke network. The 
combination of these two methods is an important first step towards identifying the optimal 
network structure. 
Our data comprised three sets: a set of spoke-carrier observations, a set of route- 
carrier observations and a set of market-carrier observations. These data included demand 
characteristics, congestion indicators,16 spoke cost variables, network cost variables and 
network characteristics. We restricted our sample to a small number of mid-sized hubs and 
data from the calender year 1992. 
We presented some preliminary results that are both consistent with the literature and 
puzzling. Our results indicated slightly increasing, possibly constant returns to scale in 
airport presence and economies of scope in destination alternative. Both constant returns to 
scale and scope economies are consistent with the literature and suggest benefits to larger 
hubs and economies in network size. As we continue to include additional observations and 
variables to the model, and obtain standard errors, we hope to improve the reliability of these 
, I findings. 
'' To be added in a later draft. 
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Data Appendix 
SDoke Cam ‘er Variables. These variables are based upon information regarding a particular 
carrier/spoke. In the case of non-entry, the data is reflective of the alternate carriedspoke. 
SUMPASS - The total number of passengers traveling with the carrier through the spoke 
regardless of the origin or destination of travel. (Source: DBlA and author’s calculations). 
SUMDOLL - The total revenue generated from passengers traveling with the carrier through 
the spoke regardless of the origin or destination of travel. (Source: DBlA and author’s 
calculations). 
ENTRY - A 0/1 variable indicating that the carrier in question has or has not entered the 
spoke in question. (Source: DB 1A and author’s calculations.) 
TSCHED - The total number of flights that the carrier has scheduled throughout the year. 
(Source: T100) 
TPERF - The total number of flights that the carrier has performed throughout the year. 
(Source: T100) 
TSEATS - The total number of seats that the carrier has made available throughout the year. 
(Source: T100) 
P A S S  - The total number of seats that the carrier has filled throughout the year. (Source: 
T 100) 
VPLANE - The variance in plane size (as measured by total number of seats per plane) for 
the carrier on performed flights throughout the year. (Source: T 100) 
DIST - The great circle distance between the outlying airport and the hub. (Source: T100) 
TOTGATES - The total number of gates at the hub airport. 
CARRGATES - The number of gates the carrier controls at the hub airport. 
Route Carrier Variables. These variables are based upon information regarding a particular 
carrierhoute. The route includes the spoke in question as one of its “legs’’ and the hub- 
I .  
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endpoint as the other “leg.” In the case of non-entry, the data is reflective of the alternate 
carrierlspoke and the endpoint. 
ENDPASS - The total number of passengers traveling with the carrier through the spoke to 
the endpoint in question. (Source: DB 1A and author’s calculations). 
ENDDOLL - The total revenue generated from passengers traveling with the carrier through 
the spoke to the endpoint in question. (Source: DBlA and author’s calculations). 
ENTRY - A 0/1 variable indicating that the carrier in question has or has not entered the 
spoke in question. (Source: DBlA and author’s calculations.) 
ROUTDIST - The great circle distance from the outlying airport to the hub in question and 
then from the hub in question to the endpoint. (Source: DBlA and author’s calculations.) 
ENDPTSHR - The share of the carrier at the endpoint reached via the spoke. (Source: 
DB 1 A.) 
NSMLSAPT - The non-stop miles from the outlying airport. 
TNPXAPT - The total number of passengers using the outlying airport. 
INCMAPT - The average income in the SMSA of the outlying airport. 
POPAPT - The population in the SMSA of the outlying airport. 
WKFCAPT - The workforce in the SMSA of the outlying airport. 
UNEMPAPT - The unemployment rate in the SMSA of the outlying airport. 
NSMLSEND - The non-stop miles fiom the endpoint. 
TNPXEND - The total number of passengers using the endpoint. 
INCMEND - The average income in the SMSA of the endpoint. 
POPEND - The population in the SMSA of the endpoint. 
WKFCEND - The workforce in the SMSA of the endpoint. 
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UNEMPEND - The unemployment rate in the SMSA of the endpoint. 
Market Carrier Variables. These variables are based upon information regarding a particular 
carriedmarket. The market include all possible routes that could be used travel between the 
outlying airport on the spoke and the endpoint on our sample or routes. For each market we 
have observations for all carriers offering service between the endpoints. 
N - The number of competitors in the market. 
NDEST - The number of destinations available from the outlying airport in the market. 
CARRDIST - The minimum distance traveled by the carrier in the market to connect the 
outlying airport and the endpoint. 
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Denver, CO 
Washington, DC** 
Detroit, MI 
Table 1 
Suokes and Alternatives 
United Denver, CO Continental 
USAir Baltimore, MD USAir 
Washington, DC*** United 
Northwest Cleveland, OH USAir 
Cleveland, OH Continental 
II Hub and Carrier In Question I Alternate Hub and Carrier 
Hub Carrier Hub Carrier 
11 Dayton,OH I USAir I Cleveland,OH I USAir 
II I Indianapolis, IN I USAir 
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St. Louis, MO TWA 
Table 1 (cont’d) 
Spokes and Alternatives 
Delta I Las Vegas, NV I Americawest 
Chicago, IL* United 
Chicago, IL* American 
Im,h I AmericaWest I SaltLakeCity,UT I Delta 
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Table 2 
Some Summary Statistics 
Does Airline Hubbing Benefit Hub Regions? 
Mark Hansen 
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to estimate the impact of airline hubbing activity on 
local air traffic and, by extension, local consumer benefits, in the United States. The crux 
of our inquiry involves the following "thought experiment": consider some airport (or 
system of airports serving the same region) that has a large amount of connecting activity- 
4.e. a "hub"--and imagine an alternative scenario in which the level of connecting activity 
is not so large. How would locally originating air traffic and the consumer benefits 
accruing therefrom be different under the latter scenario? 
This is an important question, for several reasons. First, since airports are largely 
under local control, planning and management decisions tend to emphasize local 
considerations. When an ahport is a hub, ii large proportion of its traffk is non-local. 
Airport operators have generally encouraged hubbing activity at their facilities on the 
grounds that it leads to increased service that benefits the local area (Moore, 1988), while 
opponents have emphasized the financial and environmental costs of accommodating non- 
local traffic. This paper informs that debate by assessing the fonner claim. 
This analysis is also relevant to questions concerning the fmance and pricing of 
airport services. Insofar has hubbing generates local consumer benefits, there is 
justification for pricing structures that encourage it, even if these are suboptimal in other 
respects. For example, peak-load pricing has been advocated for airports. Such pricing 
would penalize airlines operating connecting banks, perhaps inducing them to move their 
hubs elsewhere. It is important to know how such a response would affect local consumer 
welfare. Likewise, in the context of privatization it is important to recognize that the 
benefits discussed in this paper are external ones--realized by the community at large 
rather than the airport operator. Insofar as they exist, special inducements may be 
necessary if private operators are to take them into account. 
We restrict our scope to the benefits realized by consumers from changes in the 
supply of air passenger transport services to and from the hub region. We do not consider 
"benefits" in the form of increased employment or money circulating through the local 
economy. While sometimes termed benefits, these effects ought to be considered impacts, 
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since they do not necessarily increase aggregate welfare. The benefits we consider are, 
however, associated with economic impacts since many air trips are related to other 
economic activities. 
Our approach is simple. We estimate the relationship between the level of 
connecting activity (number of connecting passengers) in a regional airport system and 
the quantity of passenger traffic originating in the region. Jf, ceteris paribus, more 
connecting traffic results in more local traffic, this suggests that hubbing activity reduces 
the ''generalized cost" of air travel for the local region. To quantify the associated benefit, 
we use fare elasticity results from other studies to estimate the fare change that would 
yield the same increase in local demand. Given the equivalent fare change and fare 
elasticity, we can estimate the change in consumer surplus deriving from increased 
hubbing. 
We consider originations in the aggregate, without regard to whether the trips are 
being made by residents of the region or visitors to it. Consequently, our benefits are 
local in the sense that they accrue to individuals and f w s  who spend time in the local 
area, whether or not they actually live there. Local officials may be more directly 
interested in the welfare of residents than that of visitors. On the other hand, the trips by 
the latter generate revenues for local businesses, and for that reason are highly valued in 
most areas. It therefore seems reasonable to lump resident and non-resident trips together 
for purposes of this analysis. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review 
previous work in this area and propose a conceptual approach for measuring the local 
benefits from hubbing activity. Section 3 presents our methodology and data. Sections 4 
and 5 contain the results of our empirical analyses, which are used in Section 6 to 
estimate regional benefits from hubbing activity. Conclusions are offered in Section 7. 
2. Literature Review and Conceptual Framework 
A large amount of literature has looked at issues related to the causes and 
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consequences of airline hubbing in the U.S. and elsewhere. These papers document that 
hubbing results in increased availability and frequency of non-stop service to the local 
area, but also, at least in the cases where there is a single dominant hubbing airline, 
increased fares. There have been few, if any, attempts to weigh these opposing factors, 
along with other impacts of hubbing on local service, in order to find the net effect. 
The hubs of hub-and-spoke networks, almost by definition, have non-stop services 
to many destinations. This tendency is quantified by Bannia et al. (1992), who calculate 
for a given airline and airport, the proportion of other airports in the airline's system 
which it services non-stop from that airport. For hub airports this "hub index" is typically 
above 0.5, while for the vast majority of others it is under 0.1. The greater availability 
of non-stop service is also reflected in traffic statistics reported by the Transportation 
Research Board (1991), which show, in 1988, that the shares of local passengers flying 
direct are 80 and 72 percent for large and medium hub cities, as contrasted with 77 and 
48 percent in cities of comparable size that are not hubs. The TFU3 (1991) also reports 
that departures per thousand local passengers in 1988 was approximately twice as high 
in hub cities as in comparably sized non-hub ones. 
The enhanced services to hub regions are offset, to some degree, by higher fares. 
The TRB (1991) reports that, as of 1988, yields from traffic originating at large city hubs 
were 30 percent higher than that originating from large city non-hubs. When medium hub 
and non-hub cities are compared, the difference is 17 percent. The explanations for these 
differences have been discussed extensively (see for example Borenstein (1989), TRB 
(1991), Huston and Butler (1988). Borenstein's econometric results suggest that hub fares 
increase as a consequence of both enhanced service quality (fewer stops and higher 
frequencies) and greater airline market power (measured as the airline's share of 
originating traffic at the market endpoints). The market power effect derives from 
competitive advantages of market dominating airlines, including more attractive frequent 
flies programs, increased control of computer reservation systems, and a stronger 
reputation in the local market. Entry barriers related to limited availability of airport 
facilities and costs of starting service are also contributing factors. 
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The net benefit of hubbing to the local region therefore depends on the relative 
importance of the service impacts and the fare impacts. The following "back-of-the- 
envelope" calculation illustrates the point. According to the TRB data, the average 
passenger originating from a medium-size hub city pays a one-way fare that is about $25 
hgher than if the city is not a hub. TheR is also approximately a one-in-four chance that 
the passenger flies direct as the result of the city being a hub (this is the difference 
between the 72 percent of passengers in medium hub cities who fly direct and the 48 
percent who do so in medium non-hub cities). In order for this average passenger to be 
better off, they would have to value the direct service at $25/(1/4) or $100 in each 
direction. Assuming about a 2 hour difference in travel time, on average, between 
connecting and direct services in the same market, this would be equivalent to a value of 
travel time of $50 per hour. This compares with value of intercity travel time estimates 
in the literature, in 1990 dollars, of around $30 per hour (Brand et al, 1990; Morrison and 
Winston, 1985). 
The above analysis is overly simplistic, however. First, the impacts of hubbing on 
local air service are more complex than simply increasing the availability of direct and 
non-stop flights. There are in addition frequency effects, schedule effects, aircraft size 
effects, congestion effects, and in the long run even airport layout effects. Second, 
differentiated pricing enables airlines to target higher fares to market segments that place 
a greater value on enhanced services. With differentiated pricing and heterogeneous 
travelers, results based on averages are not very meaningful. Furthermore, the enhanced 
air service available from hubs may in fact induce changes in the composition of air 
travel whose effect is to increase yield, even if fare structures are themselves unchanged. 
For example, many oneday, premium fare, business trips for meetings in the airport 
hotels around Chicago OHare result directly from the tremendous level of air service 
there. Finally, insofar as higher yields out of hubs are related to frequent flier programs, 
their impact depends on complex interactions among business travelers, who are willing 
to pay higher fares to accumulate miles, employers, who tacitly except this practice as a 
way of giving their workers a fringe benefit, and the federal government, which has 
4 
proven unwilling or unable to tax this benefit. As Borenstein (1989, p. 346) notes, "one 
can imagine an allocation of costs and benefits from such kickbacks.[that is, frequent flier 
miles awarded to business travelers] in which the only net loser is the government." 
Figure 1 summarizes the above relationships into a conceptual framework. An 
airport's or region's hub status characterizes the level and concentration of hubbing that 
occurs their. The level and concentration of connecting traffic, and the extent to which 
it is on-line rather than interline, are primary indicators of this variable. Hub status affects 
the air service supply function at an airport. This function relates the quantity, quality, 
and price at which air service offered in an o&d market to the level of W i c  in that 
market. The function interacts with the demand functions for air service between the local 
region and other places to yield equilibrium traffic levels. The shift in the supply function 
therefore shifts the traffic levels. Additional traffic changes may occur if changes in the 
supply function cause cnanges in the demand function, as the economic composition of 
the region changes in response to the greater availability of air service. 
3. Methodology and Data 
The conceptual framework presented in the previous section can be used as a basis 
for quantifying the local benefits of airline hubbing. Indeed, it suggests a number of 
approaches, of varying levels of difficulty, complexity, and richness. At one extreme, one 
might try to quantify each of the relationships depicted by the arrows in Figure 1. In 
addition to requiring a detailed analysis of how hub status effects service supply, this 
approach would entail an understanding of how various service attributes effect overall 
service quality, and careful study of the demand side of the system. The presence of 
different market segments-such as business and leisure--compounds the challenge, since 
each has its own service preference structures, demand elasticities, and so on. 
We opt for a far simpler approach, in which we treat all airline passenger services 
from a given airport as a single, composite service. We hypothesize that hubbing activity 
changes the generalized cost of that service, downward as a result of service 
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improvements, and upward because of fare increases. If the net impact is non-zero, there 
should be a change in originating traffk, resulting from a move along the demand curve, 
and perhaps a shift of that curve as well. 
Based on this concept, we can estimate local benefits from hubbing in a given 
region using the following steps: 
Determine the relationship between the degree of hubbing and the level of originating 
traffic in the region. 
Using this relationship, predict the level of originating traffic at the airport under 
some alternative hubbing scenario. 
Determine the fare elasticity of originating traffic and average fare at the airport. 
Use the results of 3 to calculate the change in fare that would have the same impact 
on traffk as the altcmative hubbing scenario in step 2. 
Use estimated demand change and equivalent fare change to estimate the change in 
consumer surplus between the present hubbing scenario and the alternative scenario. 
The main empirical challenge of this approach is in step 1. To accomplish this 
step, we gathered Originating and connecting traffic data for 50 major U.S. regions, for 
the years 1976, 1984, and 1992. The earlier year serves as a baseline, since it is just 
before the advent of deregulation. 1984 corresponds roughly with the end of the first 
phase of deregulation, during which then was substantial hub formation and development, 
particularly on the part of upstart regional carriers such as USAir and Piedmont. The 1992 
data captures additional hub development, mainly by more established carriers like 
United, American, and Delta. 
We analyzed the above data statistically in order to assess whether and to what 
degree connecting activity influences local traffic levels. Two forms of statistical analysis 
were employed. The first approach involves classifying the fifty regions according to their 
level and intensity of connecting activity, and the changes therein over the 1976-1992 
period. We compare originating traffic levels, or changes in such levels, among regions 
in the different classes to assess the impact of hubbing activity. 
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In the second approach, we used these data to estimate an econometric relationship 
between connecting activity and originating traffk. The amount of connecting traffic is 
entered into regressions in which originating traffic is the dependent variable. 
4. Classification Analysis 
We begin by comparing the local demand levels for regions of different hub status. 
As noted above, the concept of hub status encompasses both the level of connecting 
traffic and the intensity of such traffic. Figure 2 plots the 50 regions considered in this 
analysis on a graph whose axes correspond to these variables. The horizontal axis is the 
level of connecting traffic for the year 1992, while the vertical access is the ratio of 
connecting traffic to originating W i c ,  a variable we term the hub ratio. It is clear from 
Figure 2 that the simple dichotomy of hub versus non-hub cannot be readily applied to 
the U.S. airport system. There axe regions with high levels of connecting traffic and hub 
ratios, and with low levels of connecting traffic and low hub ratios, that clearly 
correspond to hubs and non-hubs. But there axe also instances in which connecting traffic 
is high while the hub ratio is low, and vice versa. Further, the appropriate boundaries 
between "high" and "low" values for these variables are less than obvious. Rather than 
arbitrarily dividing these observations into two groups, it is preferable to look for a more 
natural set. 
Table 1 proposes a set of six hub status categories (see Ivy (1993), for an 
alternative classification scheme based of network accessibility). The fust, which we term 
meguhubs, includes regions with extremely high levels of connecting activity (12 million 
or more connecting enplanements in 1992) and in which the majority of enplanements is 
connecting (that is, with hub ratios greater than 1.0). These include the three most famous 
(or infamous) hubs--Atlanta, Chicago, and Dallas. The second group, large specialist 
hubs, compares to the first in terms of their hub ratios, but have only about half as much 
connecting activity, reflecting their smaller local markets. Like the fust group, these are 
interior cities-Charlotte, Pittsburgh, Minneapolis, and Pittsburgh. A third group, large 
non-specialist hubs, have connecting traffic levels similar to the second, but considerably 
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smaller hub ratios. The nation's premier coastal cities--New York, San Francisco, and Los 
Angeles-as well as the high growth sunbelt areas of Houston and Phoenix, are included 
here. The next lowest connecting traffic levels are associated with the small Specialist 
hubs, which have hub ratios comparable with mega- and large specialist hubs, but with 
an even smaller local traffic base. These are second- or third-tier interior cities such as 
Cincinnati, Memphis, and Raleigh-Durham. The remaining group that might be considered 
hubs have connecting traffic somewhat below, and hub ratios well below, the small 
specialists. These include second-tier coastal cities such as Boston, Philadelphia, and 
Seattle, as well as the tourist destinations of Las Vegas and Orlando. Befitting their 
questionable status as hubs, we refer to them as marginal (in line with the other 
terminology, they might also be called small non-specialist hubs). Finally, the largest 
group, consisting of 26 of the 50 regions in our data set, are the non-hubs, all of which 
have hub ratios under 9.5 and connecting traffic well under 2 million. This group contains 
certain regions, such as Baltimore and Cleveland, in which airlines operate small hubs, 
but we do not view the volume and intensity of these operations as sufficient to justify 
hub status. 
Table 2 compares local traffic intensities, measured as originations per capita, for 
the regions in the various categories. Megahubs and marginal hubs have the two highest 
values, while small and large specialist hubs have the smallest. The marginal hub results 
are strongly influenced by exceptionally high values for the tourist destinations of Las 
Vegas and Orlando. If these are excluded, the mean for this category drops to 1.40. With 
this correction, the strongest indication of a traffic stimulation impact from hubbing 
comes from the comparison of megahubs with a l l  other categories. In contrast, the large 
and small specialist results suggest that regions in these categories do not generate more 
traffic because of hubbing; if anything the effect is the opposite. This finding, which 
probably derives from the fact that the specialist hubs are more strongly dominated by 
their hub carriers, is further supported in subsequent analyses. 
The above results are based on a cross-sectional analysis, which may be 
confounded by numerous economic, demographic, and geographic factors that affect 
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regional demand for air travel. The influence of these confounding factors can be reduced 
by employing a panel analysis, in which the regional traffic levels are observed over 
several points in time. With this end in mind, figure 3 plots the 1992 hub ratio against 
the 1976 hub ratio for each of the 50 regions. On the basis of this plot, one can identify 
the regions that experienced a change in hub status over this period as the points weIi 
above the 45-degree line. These regions either became hubs or became much stronger 
hubs over this period. We term such regions strong emergers, deflining this category 
precisely using the (somewhat arbitrary) criteria that they have a 1992 hub ratio that is 
at least 1.0 and at least double the 1976 level. The strong emerger regions include 7 of 
the 9 large and small specialist hubs in the prior, cross-sectional, categorization. Regions 
in the other hub categories are excluded either because their 1992 hub ratio is too low or, 
in the case of the mega-hubs, because the ratio was already high in 1976. 
We are interested in how the change in hub status in the strong emerger regions 
affected local traffic in those regions. To investigate this, we define a second category of 
regions, non-emergers. Nonemerger regions are required to have a 1992 hub ratio that 
is less than 0.5 and less than the hub ratio in 1976. These criteria ensure that strong 
emerger and non-emerger regions stand in marked contrast. The vast majority of non- 
emerger regions are non-hubs under the cross-sectional scheme; the remainder are 
marginal and large non-specialist hubs. Regions that fail to meet the criteria for either the 
strong emerger or non-emerger regions are simply labelled other. 
Table 3 compares regions in these three hub development categories in terms of 
their average annual rate of change in originating traffic per capita between 1976 and 
1992. The growth rate for strong emergers is, on average, 0.2 percent greater than that 
of non-emergers. While qualitatively consistent with our expectation, this difference is 
small and well within the standard errors of the mean values. Thus the panel analysis is 
consistent with the cross-sectional one in suggesting that hubbing has not stimulated local 
air traffic in specialist regions. 
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5. Econometric Analysis 
The second approach to assessing the relationship between hubbing activity and 
originating traffic is with an econometric model. A major advantage to this approach is 
that it can consider hubbing to be a continuous variable rather than a qualitative one. With 
the large variation in the levels and concentrations of connecting activity among hub 
airports, such a representation is clearly desirable. It avoids the need for subjective 
classification judgements, and, by taking into account all of the variation in the original 
data, extracts more information from it. 
We try two different econometric methods. In the fmt we estimate a simple log- 
linear fmed effects model, whose basic specification is: 
(1) 
In ( ORGi,) = ai+&+w In ( POP,,) +e* In (I",,) +h- In ( CONi, 
where: 
ORG, is originating traffic from region i in year t; 
POP, is population of region i in year t; 
INC,, is real per capita income for region i in year t; 
CON, is connecting traffic from region i in year t; 
Est is a stochastic error term; 
g,f$,o,h are coefficients to be estimated. 
In the above model, the or, and hare regional and time period fixed effects, while the 
remaining coefficients can be read directly as elasticities for their associated variables. 
The model can be estimated directly from the data, so long as CON is exogenous, rather 
than simultaneously determined with ORG. We will maintain the exogeneity assumption 
for purposes of our analysis. 
We also estimated a variant of Model 1 in which the coefficient of CON, was 
allowed to differ by hub classification. In particular, we added a term, 
h,-SPD,-ln(CON,J, where SPD, is a dummy variable set to 1 only for regions classified 
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as Large Specialist or Small Specialist hubs. This was motivated by the results of the 
classification analyses discussed in the previous section. The models without and with the 
extra tern labelled Models la and lb, respectively. 
The models were estimated using a maximum likelihood procedure for regressions 
with autocorrelated error terms proposed by Beach and MacKinnon (1978) and 
implemented in the Time Series Prwssor Version 4.2 Statistical Software (Hall, 1992). 
The iterative procedure is similar to that of Cochrane and Orcutt (1949) except that the 
estimate of the autocorrelation in each iteration is based on a maximum likelihood 
procedure rather than the correlation coefficient. The procedure was employed in a 
manner so that only autocornlation within the time series of individual regions is 
considered. 
Table 5 presents estimation results. In both versions of the model, coefficients on 
CON and POP are both positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The income 
elasticity is positive, but small and statistically insignificant. The time fmed effects imply 
that, controlling for the other factors, traffic grew markedly between 1976 and 1984-a 
consequence of supply-side changes brought on by deregulation--but did not change 
significantly between 1984 and 1992. 
The Model la results imply an elasticity of ORG with respect to CON of about 
0.1-a 10 percent increase in CON results in a 1 percent increase in ORG. Within the 
framework proposed here, this implies that increased hubbing makes air travel more 
attractive to local air travelers. On balance, therefore, it appears that the service 
advantages from hubbing activity outweigh the increased fares. However, the results of 
Model 1B reveal that this benefit does not is much less strong, or even non-existent,.in 
the case of specialist hubs. This result is consistent with the findings from the previous 
section, and adds further support to the theory that dominating airlines have extracted for 
themselves the benefits of hub development in specialist regions. 
While Model 1 is easy to estimate, and may yield useful estimates of the general 
sensitivity of originating traffic to hubbing activity, it is fundamentally flawed because 
it assumes a constant elasticity of originating traffk with respect to connecting traffic. 
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The elasticity cannot be constant. When connecting traffic is very low relative to 
originating traffic, variations in it should have little effect on service supply and, by 
extension, local demand. And at the limit, zero connecting traffic clearly need not result 
in zero originating traffic, although this is what (1) implies. 
It is therefore desirable to have a functional fonn in which connecting traffic is 
more important when it is large relative to originating traffic. One such form is: 
ln (ORGic )  = ai+&+o. l n ( P O P i c )  +e* ln(INCic)  + ( a )  
$* I n [  (CONic+ORGi,) /ORGi,l +Eic  
In Model 2, the connecting traffic term is replaced with a "hub traffk multiplier" (HTM) 
term reflecting the ratio or total traffic (CON+ORG) to originating traffic. This tern is 
insensitive to CON when CONeORG, and is dominated by CON when CON>>ORG. 
This pattern 01 sensitivity is far more plausible than that implied by (1). Unfortunately, 
it cannot be estimated as easily, since it cannot be transformed so that ORG appears only 
on the left-hand side. 
To estimate Model 2, we employ the following procedure. Fht,  we estimate an 
instrument variable for ORG, using: 
In the second stage, we estimate the equation: 
l n ( O R G i c )  = ai+$- In[  (CONi,+OfiGic) /Of iGic ]  +A= l n (Of iGic )  +eic ( 4 )  
where OfiG,, is the predicted value obtained from the from (3). Thus equation (4) 
models originating traffic as a function of a "natural" traffic level estimated using (3), a 
region-specific fured effect, and the HTM estimated from (3). The region-specific fmed 
effects capture differences between a region's actual traffic and that predicted from (3) 
that are consistent across time. The $ coefficient will indicate intraregional correlation 
between these differences and the amount of hubbing as measured by the HTM. As with 
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Model 1, we also consider a variant in which the 
small and large specialist hubs. 
coefficient is allowed to vary for 
Tables 6 and 7 summarize estimation results for both stages. The instrument 
variable equation estimates, obtained using OLS, feature a somewhat lower population 
elasticity and much higher income elasticity than were obtained in Model 1. Apparently, 
the income effect in the latter was absorbed by the regional dummy variables, and also 
to some extent by the time period dummies, which are shifted upward somewhat in the 
instrument equation results. 
Table 7 shows that both the HTM and traffic instrument terms are highly 
significant. The latter is, as expected, close to 1, meaning that actual originating traffk 
is proportional to its instrumented value. The HTM coefficient is positive and highly 
significant in both versions of the model, but when it is allowed to vary for specialist 
hubs, the difference in statistically significant, and the estimate for non-specialist hubs 
roughly doubles. The results again demonstrate that hubbing activity has stimulated local 
traffic demand except in regions in the specialist categories. 
The magnitude of the HTM estimate is considerably larger than that of the 
connecting traffic elasticity estimated in Model 1, but in fact the two models are quite 
consistent except when connecting traffic is very low. Figure 4, which compares the two 
models by applying them to Atlanta in the year 1992, shows how similar the predictions 
of the two models are for the range of connecting traffk values surrounding the observed 
data point. However, while Model l b  is log-linear in connecting traffic, the Model 2b is 
convex, and flat when connecting traffic is well below instrumented originations. 
We also investigated variations of Models 1 and 2 in which connecting traffic 
coefficient were allowed to vary across all hub categories. With the exception of the 
specialist hubs, the estimates were quite similar, and we could not reject the hypthesis that 
they are in fact equal. Therefore we maintain the simpler specification in which these 
coefficients are allowed to vary only for the specialist hubs. 
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6. Local Benefils of Hubbing Activity 
The local benefits of hubbing activity can now be estimated. As noted previously, 
the procedure is to use the results of the previous section to estimate the level of 
originating traffic at an airport under some alternative hubbing scenario, Le. quantity of 
connecting traffic, estimate the fare change that would have a similar impact on 
originating demand, and use these results to estimate the consumer surplus different under 
the two scenarios. This is an admittedly rough calculation, since it aggregates across 
markets and traveler types, as well as qualitative differences in how hubbing has affected 
fares and service in different regions. Nonetheless, the results, at least give an indication 
of the order of magnitude of the effects. 
These calculations are based on the following assumptions. The alternative 
hubbing scenario is one in which there is zero connecting traffic. The assumed fare 
elasticity is -1, in the middle of the range of estimates cited in Hickling-Lewis-Brod 
(1996). The baseline fares for each region are derived from the USDOT 10 percent 
coupon survey for 1992. 
On the basis of these assumptions, and the coefficient estimates for Model 2b, we 
arrive at benefit estimates that axe summarized in Table 8. Megahubs are the clear 
winners, with regional benefits averaging nearly $800 million, or about $80 per 
origination. Large non-specialist and marginal hubs also benefit significantly from 
hubbing activity, with regional and per origination gains of around $200 million and $30 
respectively. Small and large specialist hubs, in contrast, yield little benefit from hubbing, 
as, of course, do non-hubs (since non-hub regions have non-zero connecting traffic, the 
do realize some benefit from "hubbing" despite their status). In both cases, the regional 
estimates are in the $10-$20 million range, which, given the accuracy of these estimates, 
is not much different from zero. For non-hubs, these low figures reflect small quantities 
of connecting traffic, while for the specialist hubs they derive from the observed 
insensitivity of originating traffic to hubbing activity. 
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7. conclusions 
Hubbing should benefit hub regions, for the same reasons as airlines engage in it. 
Airlines use hubs to consolidate traffic and therefore realize link economies of traffic 
volume. Through consolidation, airlines can offer direct service to more places, at higher 
frequencies, using larger aircraft. To avail themselves of these enhanced services, most 
travelers must make a connection at the hub, a penalty from which travelers to and from 
the hub region axe spared. These travelers share the good fortune of students who live 
next door to their high school, or employees who can walk to their work site. Such groups 
benefit from economies of scale, without paying the extra transport cost required to attain 
such scale. 
Our analysis shows that these benefits are realized in some instances, but not in 
others. Local travelers benefit from hubbing in the largest cities, or when hubbing activity 
is a significant but not dominant component of the regional airport traffic mix. They do 
not benefit from intensive hubbing activity in second- and third-tier cities. Therefore, most 
of the U.S. regions that became hubs after deregulation-the Charlottes, Salt Lake Cities, 
and Nashvilles--have not realized significant local air traveler welfaxe gains as a result. 
On the other hand, regions like Atlanta have benefitted mightily from hubbing, with 
consumer welfare gains on the order of $1 billion in 1992. 
The regions in which hubbing generates local welfare gains are generally those in 
which it can coexist with a relatively unconcentrated market structure. Chicago, Dallas, 
and Atlanta have markets large enough to support reasonable competition despite the very 
strong presence of hubbing carriers. Boston, San Francisco, and Detroit sustain 
competition because connecting traffic is a modest part of the overall traffic mix. When 
both of these avenues to competition are closed, the local consumer benefits from hubbing 
seem to disappear. 
On a more positive note, we find no evidence that hubbing has produced a net 
disbenefit in any region. In the worst case, hubbing is a "break-even" proposition for 
local air travelers, at least in the aggregate. Whether this aggregate result masks 
redistribution from fare sensitive leisure travelers to service-sensitive business ones is an 
15 
important question the merits further resemh. 
This analysis is not intended to fully assess the costs and benefits of hub 
development. On the negative side, the noise impacts, facility investment requirements, 
frnancial risk, and congestion effects have not been considered, while on the positive we 
have not considered revenues from user fees, taxes, and concession d e s .  In some 
regions, these items may represent second-order adjustments to the overall balance sheet. 
But in regions where hubbing offers little benefit to local air passengers, such 
considerations may be crucial to whether it should be encouraged, or even 
accommodated. 
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Airport Improvement Policy in Japan: 
New Methods of Airport Finance 
Kazahiro Ohta' 
Tokyo Denki University and The University of Iowa 
Capacity shortage of international airports in Japan is the most crucial impediment to 
liberalization and fiee competition of intemational aviation. In this paper, we deal with the 
causes of the capacity shortage, Japanese institutional systems of airport improvement, and 
new financial methods for international airport capacity expansion in metropolitan areas. 
We emphasize the e&ctiveness of the joint-stock corporation system as a useful financial 
device. The introduction of the joint-stock corporation is one kind of airport privatization, 
but its cham&m& ' 'cs completely d i e  fiom that of privatized airports in European 
Countries and the United States. 
Key words: Internatid airports, Airport Financing, Government ownership, Tempomy 
public corporation, Joht-stodr ~ O I I  
1. Introduction 
Insufficient traffic capacity in major Japanese airports is the most critical impediment to the 
liberalization and deregulation of the Japanese domestic and international air transportation 
markets. Although the Japanese Ministry of Transport (MOT) has tried to expand airport capacity 
for more than forty years, slow expansion of airport capacity, especially of international airports in 
metropolitan areas, has bought strong criticism fiom Japanese and foreign passengers and air 
Carriers. 
In this paper, first we explain past and present Japanese airport improvement plans and policy 
trends. Third, we 
compare the traditional Japanese airport improvement method with new forms of major 
Second, we descrii inherent difficulties in Japanese airport expansion. 
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. e. 1 * *  
international airports, and point out purposes and merits of new forms. Finally, we derive some 
policyimplications. 
2. The Institutional Methods of Airport Improvement in Japan 
In this section, we introduce the legislative and institutional methods of airport improvement in 
Japan. The Japanese central government has a comprehensive responsibility for airport network 
improvement, although local governments are partially responsible for their own airports. A close 
study of local airports and the roles of local government in them is not necessary for our purpose, 
because we are concerned with international airport improvement. In the first three sections, we 
deal with three important factors of airport improvement in Japan, namely, the Airport 
Improvement Act of 1956 in section 2.1, the Five-Year Airport Development Plan in 2.2, and the 
Special Account for Airport Improvement in 2.3. In 2.4, we introduce the framework of the 
current FiveYear Plan. 
2.1 The Airport Improvement Act of 1956 
For several years after World War 11, Japan was not allowed to operate air transportation, and 
all airports were requisitioned by General Headquarters (GHQ) of the Allied powers. In 
September 1951, Japan and the Allied powers signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which 
became eff'tive in April 1952. The conclusion of this treaty allowed Japan to start air 
transportation again. In October 1956, the original Japan Air Lines made its initial flight. 
Because of the military domination of air transportation in the prewar and wartime periods, and the 
prohibition during the occupation, large scale civil air transportation in Japan only began at this 
late date. 
Haneda Airport was returned to Japanese authority in July 1952, and renamed Tokyo 
International Airport. Itami Airport also was returned in 1958, and renamed Osaka International 
Airport. But, before the return of these airports, Japan needed to establish a legislative structure 
for civil aviation service. Thus, in 1956, the Airport Improvement Act was put into force as the 
basic law of airport development and &ation. 
The act defines airport institutional systems. First of all, the act classifies airports into three 
categories: Class 1, international airports, Class 2, major domestic airports, and Class 3, regional 
airports. Class 2 airports are divided into two categories - Class 2A airports which the central 
government administrates and Class 2B airports administered by local governments. Secondly, the 
act defines the airport providers and airport administrators for each category. In other words, the 
act prescribes who has authority to build and administrate airports in each category. Finally, the 
act prescribes burden shares of airport improvement costs between central and local governments 
for each airport category. 
Table 1 describes numbers of airports in each category and the burden portion of the central 
government for each category. Basic facilities consist of runways, landing areas, taxiways, and 
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aprons. Secondary facilities are drainage and lighting facilities, roads, auto parking lots, and the 
other facilities related to the airport site. 
February 1997, Source: Suji de miru koku 1997 
* : The numbers do not including airports under construction 
** : MOT: the Ministry of Transport, i.e. the Central Government 
It must be noted that the central government is not supposed to fund terminals. In general, 
airport terminals are provided by joint-stock corporations in which local governments and the 
private sector invest. The main reason for this separation of administrative bodies for runways and 
terminals was the revenue shortage of the central government. 
It is important to bear in mind that, according to the Airport Improvement Act, the central 
government is fully responsible for international airports. Japan has four Class 1 airports, Tokyo, 
Osaka, Narita and Kansai. But the central government performs its responsibility as airport 
provider and administrator only for Tokyo and Osaka Airports. That is, Narita and Kansai 
Airports are exceptions to the regulation of the act. 
2.2 The Five-Year Airport Devebpment Plan 
The main purpose of the establishment of the Five-Year Airport Development Plan was to 
indicate the national middle range targets of airport improvement and the necessary budgeting to 
reach these targets. In addition, setting of the FiveYear Plans has helped the Ministry of 
Transport to budget for airport improvement. 
The FiveYear Airport Development Plan sets the schedule of airport network improvement as a 
national goal for that period and indicates the expenditure scale related to the schedule. The 
scheduled expenditure by the Five-Year plan is not necessarily attained, because the actual annual 
budget for airport improvement is decided by the National Diet every year based on the one year 
budget principle. 
The First Five-Year Plan was for fiscal years 1967 through 197 1. In response to rapid changes 
in air transportation, the First Plan was superseded by the Second Plan in 1971. Table 2 shows the 
changes in FiveYear Airport Development Plans from the First to the Sixth. In the period of the 
First and Second Plans, more than ten local airports were improved to be jet capable. In the next 
decade, a large portion of expenditures was applied to airport vicinity envkonmental 
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countermeasure promotio% namely noise prevemtion. Finally, international airport improvement 
has been the focus since the Fifth Plan. 
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2.3 The Special Account for Airport Improvement 
The Second FiveYear Airport Development Plan was several times larm tban the First. That 
means that financial problems occurred. Therefore, the Japanese government established the 
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Special Account for Airport Improvement to secure enough funding to finance improvement 
projects of airports in the FiveYear Plans. The function of the Special Account is similar to that 
of the Airport and Airway Trust Funds. 
Revenues from airport users are transferred to the Account. Several fees and taxes for the 
Account were introduced almost shultanmusly with the establishment of the Second FiveYear 
Plan. Airport user fees, including landing fees, lightiug fees, and airplane parking h, were 
established in 1970. Airway facilities user fees were introduced in 1971. The Air Fuel Tax Act of 
1972 authorizes air fie1 taxation. The Traveling Tax on air ticket fares for the Special Account 
was replaced by the National Consumption Tax for the General Account in 1989. However, the 
same amounts of the tax revenue are supposed to be transferred from the General Account to the 
Special Account for Airport Improvement. 
Tax and fee revenues related to air transportation have been regarded as tolls for airports. The 
user burden principle has been applied to airport improvement. Thus, the central government has 
subsidized airport development very little by using its general funds. The main reason for the 
strong support for the user charge principle in the field of air transportation has been that air 
transportation was regarded as a luxury service. In hct, the Traveling Tax was one kind of excise 
tax for luxury transportation such as special cabin train and ship services. 
Figure 1. Revenue Components of the Special Account for Airport Improvement 
(Budget Bill, Fiscal 1996, billion yen) 
Transfers fbm the General Account 
Long Tam Losns 
Future Users : 23.1% 
sourcC for figures: Suji de miru hh 1997 
Figure 1 describes the amounts and proportion of each revenue source of the Special Account in 
fiscal year 1996. The revenue from the General Account forms less than ten percent of total 
revenue, and this amount is almost equivalent to that of the Traveling Tax which was abolished in 
1989. In short, the user burden principle continues to apply to airport improvement. 
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2.4 The Seventh IFhre-Yerv Airport Development Plan 
In December 1996, the Japanese Cabinet decided the Seventh Fiveyear Airport Development 
Plan. This plan includes airport improvement projects fiom 1996 to 2000. Table 3 shows the 
scale of the seventh plan. 
Total Budget Scak 
Airport Development 
Major Mettopolitan Airport except Kansai 
Kansai International Airport 
Regional Airports 
Airport Vicinity Environment promotiOn 
. Aviption Spfety - -- FaciliQ - --- - - Development - - - - - - - - - - 
Table 3. The Seventh Fiveyear Airport Development Plan 
1 Plan Term I Fiscal 1996-2000 
3,600 billion yen 
2,!5% billion yen 
1,440 billion yen 
574 billion yen 
582 billion yen 
337 billion yen 
.-- - 46?-bW.!!?r?!! ------ 
Source: The Ministry of Tnmsport 
The seventh plan emphasizes the improvement of major international airports, and allocates 2 
trillion yen to them. As for continuing projects, Haneda will spend about 600 billion yen for the 
ofihore expansion, and Narita expends about 400 billion yen until 2000. The second phase of 
Kansai Airport is allocated at about 570 billion yen. 
It is noteworthy that two new major metropolitan airport projects were authorized in the budget. 
One is the Chubu Airport near Nagoya, another is the Third Tokyo Metropolitan Airport. Both of 
these are budgeted at 200 billion yen for feasibility surveys. The seventh plan indicates that the 
second phase of Kansai and the two new airports are the “New Three Big Projects,” while the 
present “Three Big Projects’’ are the improvement of Narita, the offshore expansion of Haneda, 
and the construction of Kansai. 
3. The Delay of International Airport Improvement and the Shortage of Funds 
We previously mentioned that Japan started fiom a situation of almost no modern airports and 
then rapidly developed an ahport network, and we reviewed the institutional systems which 
administered its rapid expansion. These institutional systems have contributed to its steady 
expansion. However, there is now an international airport capacity shortage. In this section, we 
discuss the causes of this shortage. The strong movement against Narita Airport is the main 
reason for delays in its expansion, but this is not our present concern, because this is specific to 
Narita. We review the demand aspect of air transportation in section 3.1 and the supply aspect of 
funds for airport improvement in 3.2. In addition, we deal with the high cost factors for airport 
improvement in Japan in 3.3. 
3.1 The Rapid Increase of Air Transportation Demand 
It is easy to imagine that rapid and continuous increase in air transportation demand results in a 
shortage of airport capacity. The expansion of an airport network requires a long time period. 
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Thus, a t h e  lag easily occurs between increase in demand and increase in airport capacity. In 
fict, most major intcmational airports in the world are struggling with the recent rapid air 
transportation demand increases. 
In addition, Japan has experienced discontinuous change in the trend of international air 
transportation. The trend of the number of Japanese overseas travelers, most of whom use air 
traasportatiOn, changed in 1985 when the yen began to appreciate rapidly due to the Plaza Accord. 
Figure 2 reveals clearly this trend change. 
Figure 2. Actual and Forecast Japanese Overseas Travelers and Foreign Visitom 
(ten thousands) 
1.300 I 
Forecast Numbers 
by the Forth 
Comprehensive 
National 
Development 
Plan of 1987 
0 
1975 80 85 90 93 95 2ooo &ear) 
Source: Egashir;5 K. (1994), "Issues m The National Land Policy for New Era," 
Quarterb ReviewMOBLU", No. 97,4153. Cm Japanese) 
Figure 2 also describes the hecast numbers of the Fourth Comprehensive National 
Development Plan produced by the National Land Agency in June 1987. This plan outlines 
policies for national development toward the twenty first century. The Ministry of Transport 
participated in the development of this plan, and so the demand forecast m the Fifth FiveYear 
Airport Development Plan was consistent with the forecast of this plan. Figure 2 tells us that these 
plans underestimated future demand for international airports. This underestimated future demand 
has caused the delay of international airport capacity improvement. 
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3.2 "he Shortage of Funds for International Airport Improvement 
We deal here with the difficulties of the supply side of airport service, and focus on financial 
problems when the mtral  government is the main airport provider and administrator. We should 
separate funding shortage problems into two categories - general problems of airport funding and 
those of major metropolitan airports. 
There are four main problems of the Special Account for Airport Improvement. First, the 
account is relatively small, receiving little money from the General Account. The expditure of 
the account is the amount which the central government spends for airport improvement. This has 
been less than 1.5 percent of total central government public works spending in last decade. The 
amount for airports has been less than 65% of fishery ports or 40% of seaports for more than the 
last fifteen years. Airport users pay most of the expenses of the account, while general taxpayers 
bear the costs of the Special Account for Seaport Improvement or the subsidization scheme for 
fishery ports. 
Clearly, the user burden principle applies to airport improvement, which means that Japanese 
believe that air transportation users should not be subsidized. This judgment arises from the public 
belief that air transportation services are a luxury for the wealthy. This belief is losing strength, 
but is still dominant. 
Second, the account has no means of directly imposing fees on consumers of air services. That 
is, Japan does not have any fces similar to the Ticket Tax and Air Freight Bill Tax in the United 
States. According Figure 1, the account imp0ses several fees on airlines, while the Airport and 
Airway Trust Fund gathers more than eighty percent of its funds from final air transportation 
service coasumers. It is more difficult to increase fees on airlines than on final users. In fact, the 
landing fees in Class 1 and Class 2A airports have not increased since 1980. Airlines oppose the 
increase of nationwide d o r m  airport charges by network expansion, because their marginal 
revenue decreases with the network expansion. 
Third, the revenues from terminal business are not transferred to the account, because the 
ownership and operation of airport terminals are separated from central government activity. 
Originally, in the 195Os, the government had no fund for terminal construction, and so left 
terminals to joint-stock corporations' activities. It did not invest in these corporations. Therefore, 
the account can not get any revenues fiom terminal business activities. 
Fourth, the account can not obtain revenue fiom the operation of Class 2B and Class 3 airports. 
The Airport Improvement Act mandates that the administrators of these airports be local 
governments. These administrators have the right to impose airport user charges such as landing 
fees. The account subsidizes the construction of these airports, but does not receive any returns 
from its expenditures. In contrast, the United States Airport and Airway Trust Fund increases 
revenues through the Ticket Tax, while it does not receive any airport user charges. This problem 
is also related to the whole charging system for airport uses. 
With respect to major metropolitan airports, for example Haneda Airport, the funding shortage 
problem has increased. First, Haneda has worked as a main subsidizer for the construction of 
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many new local airports. Such cross-subsibtion is efficient and reasonable only when it is 
limited to the amount of network effect. However, Haneda has contributed much more to the 
account than this limitation. Thus, Haneda has become too congested to accept new flights, while 
many local airports have been completed and should be connected to Haneda Airport by regular 
Second, we should mention that political issues have affected the delay in the expansion of 
Haneda Airport. The Japanese airport network plan indicates that every pref-e has a right to 
own at least one airport. However, several prefectures do not need to have an airport. Political 
arguments for equity or equality related to transportation infi.astructure networks often force 
profitable facilities to donate excess revenues to form the networks. 
flights. 
33 The Heavy Expenditure for Airport Improvement 
The funding shortage, which delays airport improvement, is related to the high costs of 
improvement. Airport development in Japan is extremely expensive, especially in metropolitan 
areas where most air transportation demands exist. In this section, we review the causes of high 
costs of airport improvement in Japan. 
First, high land prices increase airport construction costs. Part of these high land prices can be 
attributed to a high level of economic activity. If we compare Japan with the United States, we see 
that Japanese GDP (Gross Domestic Product) is about half that of the United States, although this 
relative proportion depends on the exchange rate. The Japanese population is also approximately 
half the American, while the area of the United States is roughly twenty five times than Japan. 
Thus, the amount of GDP per acre in Japan is about twelve times larger than that of the United 
States. Furthermore, more than seventy percent of Japanese territory is so mountainous that 
efficient economic activity is difficult. Therefore, it is not surprising that land prices in Japan are 
fifteen or twenty times of American ones (Also see Sakakibara[ 19941). 
High land prices can be attributed partially to public administration systems which are based on 
traditional Japanese behavior. Many Japanese have a tendency to be attached to land ownership, 
especially lands inherited fiom ancestors. Some Japanese refuse to move to another place even if 
they are offered compensation by public authorities, or will suffer deterioration of their living 
environment. Ordinary Japanese have not accepted the concept of eminent domain, and think that 
enforcement of land acquisition by eminent domain is unfair as well as highly unusual treatrnent. 
In addition, the compulsory land acquisition procedure is time-consuming and regarded as the 
worst possible method, so that public officials hesitate to resort to it. Public authorities will 
therefore spend more money to acquire necessary land, in order to avoid the problems of 
compulsory acquisition. 
Second, the cost of noise protection is high in Japan. The completion of the compulsory 
movement of neighboring residents and farmers is more difficult than that fiom the airport site 
itself, even though people in these surrounding areas suffer from airport noise. That is, even if 
public authorities can force residents on the site of an airport to move, and so acquire the land for 
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the airport, it can not force residents in the surrounding area to move to more noise-fiee areas. So, 
people who remain in the area complain about noise pollution. Therefore, the airport or public 
authority in charge of noise pollution has to spend large amount of money to compensate them. 
Table 2 describes the Special Account for Airport Improvement spding of 343 billion yen for 
environmental protection in the period of the Third FiveYear Plan and 475 billion yen in the 
period of the Fourth Plan. These expenditures were more than forty percent of the total expenses 
of the account during these plan periods. Including the expenses fiom the account, the central 
government has spent more than 1 trillion yen since 1967 to provide various noise protection 
devices not only for public facilities but also for individual residences, including doubleglazed 
windows, air conditioners, and television adjusters. 
Besides these two factors, there are several rational and irrational causes, such as high 
construction costs for public works, for the very large expenditures for airport development in 
Japan. In addition to monetary expenditures, it takes a long time to construct new airports in 
metropolitan areas. 
Roughly speaking, until recently, Japanese, except for business executives and prosperous 
travelers going abroad, have thought that intenrational airports bring only negative effects to them. 
Recently, this anti-airport feeling has begun to change, but st i l l  remains strong among ordinary 
Japanese. Therefore, we must accept high costs on the inescapable condition, and have to design 
appropriate methods for the necessary improvement of international airports. 
4. Two New Forms of Airport Improvement Compared with the Traditional System 
As mentioned in sections 2.1 and 2.2, according to the Airport Improvement Act of 1956, the 
central government has the responsibility for construction, administration and operation of Class 1 
airports. But of the four airports categorized as Class 1, only Haneda and Osaka are operated by 
the central government. As for the two more recent airports, Narita and Kansai, the central 
government has taken Werent paths for their administration and operation, both of which are 
exceptions to the fundamental principle of the Airport Improvement Act. 
In principle, the Japanese government is supposed to own and operate directly major 
international airports. The first exception to this principle was in 1966 when the New Tokyo 
International Airport Authority was established. The second is the Kansai International Airport 
which opened in 1994, built and operated by a joint-stock corporation. The principal purpose of 
these exceptions was to raise funds for construction of these two new major international airports. 
In this section, we examine three forms of ownership: Haneda Airport as an example of 
government ownership, Narita Airport as a public corporation, and Kansai as a joint-stock 
corporation, and compare these three systems by describing their merits and demerits in terms of 
finance methods. In 4.1, we describe the role and problems of Haneda Airport as a subsidizer for 
other airports, and introduce the finance system for the expansion of Haneda Airport. In 4.2, we 
focus on Narita Airport as a temporary public corporation, and indicate the financial advantages 
compared with government ownership. The main topic in 4.3 and 4.4 is the financial systems and 
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strategies of Kansai Airport which is a joint-stock corporation which seems to be unprofitable. We 
focus on the fund raising of the first runway opened in 1994 in 4.3, and that of the second runway 
in 4.4. 
4.1 Government Ownelship 
Govemment ownership of airports, or a substantial government commitment to airport 
improvement is common, especially during the stage of the development of air transportation. 
During the occupation after World War 11, airports were taken over and air transportation was 
prohibited in Japan. Finally, in 1951 Japan again started civil air transportation. Therefore, 
government ownership of airports was widely accepted. In the first half of this section, we 
consider the characteristics of the Tokyo International Airport (hereinafter Haneda Airport) as a 
subsidizer. The second half explains the financing for the ofihore expansion of Haneda Airport. 
4.1.1 Characteristics of Hmeda Airport 
Government ownership of airports in Japan has been associated with a uniform airport user 
charge and cross-subsidization among airports. Haneda Airport had been profitable and one of the 
main contributors to fund raising for airport network f m t i o n  in Japan. However, the ofihore 
expansion project of Haneda Airport changed this situation. Even though Haneda Airport with its 
ofihore expansion is profitable in the long term, it can not contribute to airport network 
improvement funding during the expansion. We focus on Haneda Airport as a main contributor 
and on this change in its financial situation. 
At the stage of network formation of transportation inf+astructure, cross-subsidization of 
unprofitable by profitable routes or of routes under construction by existing routes is often used as 
a device of financing for a whole network. Several trust funds of transportation in the United 
States have played a critical role as a method of pooling revenue to provide necessary funds for 
less trafficked routes. The Highway Trust Fund and the Airport and Airway Trust Fund in the 
United States are typical examples of cross-subsidization, as is the revenue pooling system of the 
Japan Highway Public Corporation which is in charge of expressway network formation (see 
Fuji[ 19891). 
Cross-subsidization brings two problems. One is inefficient economic performance, another is 
a perception of inequity or unfairness. Even if cross-subsidization is inefficient, implementation of 
cross-subsidization can be accepted fkom the viewpoint of balanced national development, because 
it can cultivate rapid formation of transportation inf+astructure. 
With respect to the highway network, the scale and scope of cross-subsidization needs to be 
limited when most of the network system is completed. For example, in the United States, the 
ISTEA (Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991) prescribed that ninety percent 
of fuel tax revenue be returned to the original states where the fuel tax was charged, and so has 
limited the maximum scale of cross-subsidization between states to no more than ten percent. In 
addition, the Japanese government and the Ministry of Construction are seeking to decide the 
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standards for limits of cross-subsidization among routes which the Japan Highway Public 
Corporation operates as toll highways. 
Air transportation is different from the highway network, because stronger network effects 
among airports exist. If a new airport is opened and flights between the new airport and an 
existing one begin, the demand for the existing airport increases. Thdore ,  cross-subsidization 
fiom existing airports to new airports is j d e d  more strongly than between highway routes. 
The strong demand for cross-subsidization, which is associated with political pressures whose 
purposes are regional development and the backward linkage effect of public works, produces an 
excessive burden on profitable existing airports. The first principle of network formation for 
several kinds of transportation inhistructure in Japan is equality, followed by fair distribution and 
efficiency. For instance, the 14,000 km national expressway network plan was set so that all cities 
of 100,000 or more population would be within one hour of an expressway entrance. With respect 
to airports, all prefectures should have at least one airport with jet plane capability. The scale of 
airport network has been decided &om the viewpoint of equality, not on the efficient balance of 
demand and supply. 
Japanese have believed that the price of public services which the government offers must be 
equal among users, even if different user consumes the service at different places and times. 
Different costs of providing the same kind of service occur at difFerent places and times, so the 
same price under diffkremt cost conditions is one kind of price discrimination, and brings 
inefficiency. 
The uniform user charge scheme sometimes causes a continuous increase of price level, 
otherwise the progress of network farmaton is postponed. Another possibility under conditions of 
unchanged price levels is that profitable airports develop a shortage of capacity even as new 
unprofitable airports are built. 
This last option was chosen in Japan. The level of landing fees, including the special landing 
fee, has not been changed since 1980, except for the introduction of the National Consumption Tax 
in 1989. On the other hand, twenty four airports in addition to the Kansai Airport were opened or 
upgraded to jet capability between 1981 to 1995. Haneda and a few other profitable airports have 
continued to give their menue to the Special Account for Airport Improvement in order to finance 
newly opened or upgraded airports, while these profitable airports have had little capacity 
improvement. 
4.1.2 The Oit3hore Expansion of Haneda Airport 
To keep the same level of d o r m  airport user charges and transfer the revenue fiom profitable 
existing airports to an expansion of the airport network can delay necessary traffic capacity 
expansion for subsidizing airports. Haneda Airport is a typical example. 
These problems of fbnding shortages for the expansion and delay of improvement of Haneda 
Airport had been widely recognized at an earlier period. Then, the Japanese administration 
introduced a new scheme to improve Haneda Airport. It uses borrowing fiom the Government 
Treasury Investment and Loan Program, which previously had been unavailable for airport use. 
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The Special Account for Airport Improvement will pay back principal and interest for the loan 
from fbture airport revenues. This was the first loan to the Special Account for Airport 
Improvement. While the Special Account is related to the Five-Year Plan, it employed a oneyear 
budget system without any borrowing. As fiequently mentioned, a oneyear budget system brings 
underinvestment in facilities which are profitable in the long term. Without borrowing, the 
offshore expansion project of Haneda Airport would have never started. 
Haneda Airport has two runways, but they are not parallel to each other. Traffic demand for 
Haneda Airport achieved maximum possible utilization level around 1971. The Ministry of 
Transport limited Haneda Airport to domestic transportation when Narita Airport was opened in 
1978. The policy of allocating international fights to Narita Airport allowed the Ministry time to 
plan the expansion of Haneda Airport. Finally, the Ministry began to expand Haneda Airport into 
Tokyo Bay in 1984. 
The completion of this project will offer two parallel runways and one crosswind runway. The 
number of annual landings and takeofli will be increased to about 255,000, while that before the 
expansion was only 160,000. This is a threxstep project, and the second has been completed. The 
total cost including land fill has been predicted at about 1,480 billion yen. 
4.2 Public Corporation 
In late 1950's, only a few years after Japan had started civil aviation again, the Ministry 
recognized the need for a new large international airport with four parallel runways for the Tokyo 
metropolitan area. In 1962, the Ministry of Transport officially began to search for an appropriate 
place for a new airport. In 1966, the Cabinet decided the location and scale of the new airport. 
The planned scale was changed fiom four to two parallel runways later. 
The construction work on Narita Airport, located about 40 des east of central Tokyo, began 
in 1969, but the completion of the first runway was delayed fiom 1971 to 1975 and its opening 
until 1978 because of fierce opposition fiom a coalition of local inhabitants and left wing activists. 
The second passenger terminal was opened in 1992, and the airport annually handles about 
120,000 flights and some 24 million passengers. The maximum of number of landings and 
takeoffs and passengers will be increased to 220,000 flights and 38 million passengers, when the 
second runway is completed. 
The New Tokyo Internati0~1 Airport Authority (hereinafter Narita Airport Authority) is in 
charge of the construction, administration and management of Narita Airport. Narita Airport 
Authority was established in 1966 by the New Tokyo International Airport Authority Act of 1965. 
This Act authorized that Narita Airport Authority is the airport provider and administrator. 
According to the Airport Improvement Act, the Minister of Transport has the responsibility of 
being the provider and administrator of Class 1 airports. Therefore, Narita Airport Authority was 
the first exception in the institutional system of airport ownership and administration. 
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In this section, we focus on the characteristics of Narita Airport Authority, and describe its 
financial merits. We will emphasize that Narita Airport Authority is not similar to ordinary airport 
authorities in the United States and European countries, but is a temporary public corporation. 
4.2.1 The Establishment of Narita Airport Authority 
The Japanese government established Narita Airport Authority for two reasons. 
The first was the shortage of funds in the Special Account for Airport Improvement. When the 
construction plan of Narita Airport arose, the Account was prohibited to borrow money. 
Furthermm Haneda Airport was the main source of funding for the Special Account, and 
Haneda's profits were inadequate to finance previous Special Account commitments as well as the 
Narita Airport construction project, so a new funding source was necessary. 
The cost of airport improvements near metropolitan areas in Japan is the most expensive in the 
world. In fact, Narita Airport Authority spent about 285 billion yen fiom 1966 to 1977 for the 
construction of only the first runway and the first passenger terminal. 
Therefore, the government decided to separate Narita Airport fiom the revenue pool of the 
Special Account. In other words, the govenunent distinguished international air transportation 
fiom domestic. 
Secondly, although the existing airports could not iinance a new large international airport, 
Narita Airport had been predicted to be profitable in the long term. This was because it is 
authorized as the principal international airport in Japan, which means that most international air 
transportation to and fiom the Tokyo metropolitan area would have been transfmed fiom Haneda 
Airport. Stand-alone management including long term iinance would have seemed to be possible 
for Narita Airport with appropriate financial assistance and institutional support of the 
government. 
The introduction of the public corporation system to airport construction was an attempt to 
overcome the governments one-year budgetary principle. However, this procedure was not new to 
transportation in€iastructure in Japan. Similar systems had been introduced for railroads, seaports 
and highways by the early 1950's. 
Public corporations can be divided into two types. One is a going concern such as the Japan 
National Railways before privatization, and the other is a temporary concern. Japan had the Japan 
Highway Public Corporation as an example of a temporary concern related to transportation, while 
it considered the institutional system for a new airport in Tokyo. The Narita Airport Authority 
belongs to the category of the temporary concern public corporation. 
4.2.2 Financing by Borrowing and the Redemption Scheme 
It is helpful to describe the hc t ion  of a temporary public corporation before explaining the 
fund raising of Narita Airport in detail. Take a toll bypass road for example: 
A public road corporation which is in charge of construction and management of a bypass 
borrows money to carry out its work. Suppose that in principle, a local government has to improve 
and administrate public road facilities. So, such a corporation is an exception to this principle. 
The corporation is required to charge tolls to bypass users, and repay all the principal and interest 
14 
Kazuhiro OHTA, Airport Improvement Policy in Japn: New Methodr of Airport Finance 
for the borrowed money, as well as maintenance costs, through the toll revenue. The toll level is 
calculated on the premise that total terminal revenues would be equal to total tenninal costs 
including interest. 
The transaction at the end of the redemption period is important. When the corporation 
redeems all principal and herest, it is supposed to give the assets of the bypass to the government, 
and dissolve. If the government invests in the corporation, the capital must be also repaid by the 
toll revenue. The corporation will have no assets on the balance sheet at the end of redemption 
period because all capital will have been returned to the government through revenues. 
The Japanese government has supplied twenty percent of total construction costs of Narita 
Airport as capital investment. This capital investment comes from the Special Account for Airport 
Improvement. Furthermore, since the Account does not seek any dividends from this investment, 
there is an effective subsidization of the sum of this foregone interest. 
To finance the remaining eighty percent, Narita Airport Authority issues two types of bonds. 
One is purchased by the government through the Government Treasury Investment and Loan 
Program. The other kind is publicly offered. Narita Airport Authority is supposed to finance 
seventy percent of interest-bearing h d s  by the former, and the remaining thirty percent by the 
latter. 
User fees from airlines are the main source of revenue for Narita Airport. In addition, Narita 
Airport h p e s  PSFC(the Passenger Service Facilities Charge) for departing international 
passengers as a direct user charge. Compared to major airports in the world, the percentage of 
non-air transportation revenue such as concessions is small, because Narita Airport Authority can 
not expand businesses beyond the limits set by the New Tokyo International Airport Authority Act. 
Narita Airport Authority is expected to transfer its airport facilities to the central government 
and dissolve when the loan is redeemed. In principle, the airport will then contribute to the Special 
Account as a new donor. However, the government will probably propose the privatization of 
Narita Airport Authority in the future. 
4.3 Joint-stock Corporation 
The Kansai International Airport which opened in 1994 has several noteworthy characteristics. 
First, it was built by reclaiming land three miles off-shore in the southeastern part of Osaka Bay. 
Second, it is noisefiee because of its location. Third, the airport provides Japan with its first 
twenty-four-hour airport. Fourth, the airport offers comprehensive cmection service between 
international and domestic flights. Fifth, surface access by trains and cars and marine access by 
boats are well organized for major cities in the Kansai metropolitan area. Sixth, the construction 
cost was very expensive, 1,470 billion yen for one runway. Finally, the airport is owned and 
operated by a joint-stock corporation. The official name of the corporation is Kansai International 
Airport Company, Ltd.(hereinafter, Kansai Airport Company). 
The last two facts seem to be inconsistent each other. Large investment cost makes the project 
risky. In general, national governments directly conduct large scale risky national projects such as 
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international airports. Even if the privatization of the British Airport Authority is successful, 
privatization at the stage of infrastructure improvement completely differs from that at the stage of 
operation and administra tion. In fact, the Airport Policy of 1985, which set the fundamental 
direction for the privatization of BAA, concluded that large scale capacity expansion in the London 
metropolitan area would not be needed so that the privatization of BAA was justified. In short, the 
privatization of the Kansai International Airport is based on a different justification. In this and 
the following sections, we describe the purpose and fiamework of the finance system related to 
KansaiAirport. 
43.1 The Purpose of the Formation of a Joint-stock Corporation 
The first purpose of privatbtion, m general, is to improve economic efficiency through 
promotion of entrepreneurship. Each entrepreneur advances their productive efficiency by 
minimizing their costs in order to maximize their profits. With respect to Kansai Airport 
Company, no one believes that the company minimhs the construction cost of the airport. 
Clearly, the purpose of the privatization is not to improve efficiency. 
The purpose of the formation of a joint-stock corporation was simply to raise funds from both 
local governments and private companies. The central government had already decided to invest 
the same percentage of total construction costs in Kansai Airport Company as it did in Narita 
Airport, that is twenty percent. As mentioned before, in principle the government is responsible for 
major international airports, but this principle had already violated in the case of Narita Airport 
and its burden of twenty percent had become a precedent. The Ministry of Finance, but not the 
Ministry of Transport, persisted in keeping the twenty percent rule, and wanted to make it a 
precedent. The twenty percent scheme was established as the rule of burden sharing between the 
central government and others with respect to major international airports, when the institutional 
framework of Kansai Airport was decided. 
First, the scale of 
economic activities in its metropolitan area is smaller than that in Tokyo. In order to mitigate this 
disadvantage, the Ministry of Transport planned that Kansai Airport would be an ideal airport with 
good access to the Kansai area and good umnections between international and domestic flights. 
In addition, at first the Ministry decided that Osaka International Airport would have redundant 
capacity and therefore be closed, so that all air transportation demands for the Kansai area would 
be concentrated at Kansai Airport. However, recently it decided to keep Osaka Airport in service. 
Secondly, construction was expensive, because the airport was constructed on an artificial 
island. In addition, the predicted construction cost was uncertain, because no one could forecast 
the exact rate of ground subsidence. In fact, the fust estimated construction cost was about 1,000 
billion yen including interest until the opening, but the real cost increased to about 1,500 billion 
Yen.  
In short, both the demand and supply situations for Kansai Airport were worse than Narita 
Airport. Therefore, the official feasibility study suggested that the amounts of thirty, rather than 
twenty percent, of total construction costs should be fjnanced by zero interest money. 
Unfortunately, Kansai Airport is less profitable than Narita Airport. 
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The Ministry of Finance insisted on the twenty percent principle, which means the central 
government could spend a maximum of twenty percent of total construction costs. Thus, the 
Ministry of Transport had to create a new device to finance the remaining ten percent with zero 
iuterest. It decided to adopt a joint-stock corporation, and supply a special legal position to the 
corporation by the Kansai International w o r t  Company Ltd. Act of 1984. 
This act allows the central government, local governments and private companies to invest in 
the company. The investors do not have any economically rational incentive to invest money in the 
corporation, because they will not get any dividends fiom the corporation for a very long time. 
In short, this act allows the company to receive the remaining ten percent of the costs with zero 
iuterest fiom local government and private companies. More concretely, the local governments and 
private companies each invest a total of five percent in the Airport Company. 
According to the early feasibility study, total costs would be about 1,000 billion yen, but 
actually it became about 1,500 billion yen, mainly because ground subsidence occurred more 
rapidly than expected and completion was delayed. Even still, the revised feasibility study in 1990 
supposed that Kansai Airport would be profitable in the middle term with a total cost of 1,430 
billion yen. The study reported that the company would be annually profitable five years after 
opening, and as its cumulative profits would offset accumulated losses, then it would be able to 
pay dividends after another four years. The company would finish redeeming all fixed liabilities 
twenty-three years after completion. The local 
governments and private companies which had invested in the company have not actually sought 
dividends, at least in the short and middle terms. 
43.2 The Justification tor a Joint-stock Corporation 
Even if the practical purpose of a joint stock corporation is to finance the construction of the 
airport, the burden on local governments and private companies is not necessarily justified. The 
investment of these governments and companies means that the Kansai region bears a portion of 
the costs of what is a national project. This regional cost allocation of a public project requires 
justification, which we examine here. 
Justification of a policy which imposes this regional burden relies on the benefit principle, 
which means that each beneficiary of a project should share the cost of the project according to 
benefits it gets. This is the so-called principle of ‘‘returning gains fiom development”. 
For example, transportation investments such as the construction of a new commuter railroad 
cause increases in land prices. We frequently observe this phenomenon in suburban areas in 
Japan. The major Japanese private railroad companies internalize and capture these spillover 
benefits by operating real estate and housing enterprises. 
In general, improvement in transportation infrastructure brings several economic development 
effects which sometimes are called external effects. Pecuniary external economies are also 
important fiom the viewpoint of cost allocation, while economics focuses only on technological 
externalities and ignores pecuniary ones because they are regarded only as transfers between 
However, no one believed this calculation. 
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economic agents. Actually, transfers of benefits fiom a project are significant in consideration of 
the cost allocation of the project. 
First, with respect to a backward linkage ef€e!ct, any projects in a certain region which demand 
labor, materials and equipment produce multiplier effects in that region. In other words, projects 
give the region injections which increase regional income. Therefore, the opportunity cost of such 
an effect, on the grounds that the relevant project is financed by the national treasury, is the loss of 
expected income increase in other regions ifthat same money was spent in these other regions. The 
backward linkage effect of increase in income m a certain region is merely a transfer from others. 
As an extreme example, the construction of Kansai Airport required considerable landfill for the 
reclaimed island, so that the price of fill in the region approximately doubled. Because transport 
costs are high for fill dirt, the Kansai Airport Company had to buy expensive local f l l  dirt. The 
fill dirt providers in the Kansai area made profits of up to one hundred percent. Clearly, such rents 
are just income transfers to relatively richer people in the region. 
Second, improvements of transportation infrastructure in a certain region make the region more 
attractive to businesses, so fhctories, offices, and other facilities move to this region fiom other 
areas. Increases in the numbers of such facilities and economic activities bring additional income 
tax revenues to local governments, and also raise property tax revmues based on rising real estate 
values and the number of these facilities. Since newcomers move fiom some other region, these tax 
revenue increases amount to transfers from the other region. 
Third, if transportation in6astructure improvement causes increases in regional land prices, 
these increases also are transfers from the users of the ix&astructure to land owners. These 
transfers can be eliminated if the operator of the Mastructure charges sufficiently higher fees to 
users. However, these fees are usually regulated lower than such sufficiently high levels and 
sometimes at a level below their costs. 
Under all of these situations, some income redistriiution is required fiom the beneficiaries to the 
in6astructure operator from the viewpoint of equity or fairness. 
It is ideal to identifL and directly charge beneficiaries according to their benefits. Practically, 
direct charges are impossible because of expensive transaction costs and political opposition. Even 
approximate methods such as SAD (Special Assessment Districts) or TIF (Tax Incremental 
Finance Districts) are not accepted in Japan. 
In the case of Kansai Airport, the central government has used approximate methods instead of 
direct charges. More concretely, it asked local governments and major private companies in the 
Kansai region to invest in the airport company. They have accepted this proposal, because they 
knew the project brought large and broad economic benefits to the region. 
4.4 Separation of Foundation Work and Superstructure: Phase II of Kansai Airport 
The plan for Phase II of Kansai Airport consists of the second runway and the second terminal. 
The completion of Phase I1 will increase the capacity of annual number of landings and takeof% 
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fiom 160,000 to 230,000. The construction cost is predicted to be 1,560 billion yen, while that of 
Phase I was 1,458 billion yen. 
It is obvious that Phase 11 is less profitable than Phase I, and the development effects of Phase 
11 are smaller than Phase I. A similar estimation applies to social benefits. AU aspects except the 
backward linkage effect indicate that the completion of Phase 11 is less necessary. But, in 
December 1996, about fifteen months after the opening of the airport, the Japanese government 
decided to begin Phase II. More precisely, the Ministers of Finance and Transport agreed on the 
fundamental finance framework of Phase 11. And, the swenth Five-Year plan for airport 
improvement, which the Cabinet approved in December 1996, one year after the Ministers’ 
agreement, authorized an expenditure of 574 billion yen fiom the Special Account for Phase 11 
fiom 1996 to 2000. 
This decision was controversial, which means that it is more difficult to justify Phase 11 than 
Phase I. In the first half of this section, we discuss the motivation and possible justification of 
Phase II. In the second half; we review Gnancial measures for Phase II. 
4,4.1 The Motivation for the Construction of the Second Runway 
The official justification relies on the forecast for long term demand for Kansai Airport. It 
seems reasonable that traffic demand will exceed the present capacity of Kansai Airport in 2010. 
This prediction can justify the construction of the second runway. On the other hand, we can 
easily note that many congested airports have a tendency to postpone large scale improvements. 
For example, Heathrow Airport has adopted conservative investment policies in order to avoid the 
risk associated with large scale investments. To show sufficient demand for large projects gives 
governments an opportunity to justifL these projects, but some economists emphasize that it is a 
necessary but not suflicient condition. 
The motivation for the second runway has primarily depended on enthusiasm rather than the 
rational judgment of self interest. We have often heard “Rehabilitate the Kansai (or Revitalize the 
Kansai)” as a slogan in the Kansai area. This slogan implies more than it appears. People in the 
Kansai area have worried about its continuous relative decline of economic power vis a vis the 
Tokyo metropolitan area. The Kansai area had been the ~ t i 0 ~ 1  capital for more than one 
thousand years until the Meiji Restoration in 1868, when Tokyo became capital. Kansai 
businesses have long been famed for entrepreneurial aggression, but the recent concentration of 
international and domestic economic activity in Tokyo has sharply increased their anxiety. Thus, 
“Rehabilitate” meam to recover past glory and obtain an advantage over Tokyo. 
Kansai Airport has become the symbol of the “Rehabilitation” of the Kansai area, because the 
airport has several notable aspects such as the location and twenty-four hour operation. In 
conclusion, the political leaders and business executives in the Kansai area have been willing to 
bear a portion of the cost of Kansai mort, even if this burden is economically irrational. 
The completion of Phase II will give the region an opportunity for fiyther development. 
Especially if air traffic capacity in the Tokyo metropolitan area will continue to be restricted to the 
present level due to the strong opposition against the expansion of Narita Airport, the Kansai 
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Airport with two parallel runways would be able to become the principal gateway to Japan. Some 
people in the Kansai region have imagined this scenario as a part of the “Rehabilitation” of the 
Kansai. 
Another possible justification for Phase II is related to the inherent characteristics of 
transportation infi9stnrcture. With respect to large scale inf”cture such as airports, seaports 
and expressways, providers of inhstructure are not the same as the direct users of this 
infrastructure. Fair competition among airlines as direct users of airports brings efficient and hir 
results when there is excess airport capacity which guarantees free entry and free exit to air 
transportation services. 
Sometimes there is a shortage of transportation idiastructure without harmful effect to 
competition among private transport carriers. For example, deregulation policies in the trucking 
industry are minimally affected by highway congestion. In short, a government can allow anyone 
to begin a trucking business, even though the highway network is heavily congested. 
Of course, we can consider some types of bidding systems for slots at congested airports. 
However, biddiug systems at congested airports bring only the transfer of rents fiom air carriers 
with existing slots to airport operators. In other words, it improves only the short term economic 
efficiency of resource allocation, but does not benefit consumers. 
When insufficient airport capacity restricts the number of slots, fiee competition through the 
bidding for limited slots does not improve air transportation Service benefits for final users. The 
competition among air carriers will increase passengers and shippers only when airport hcilities 
have enough excess capacity to accept new flights. Particularly, airports near metropolitan areas 
should have excess capacity sufficient to cope with future increases in traffic volume, because the 
construction of new airport facilities takes a long time while rapid increases in air traffic are 
predicted everywhere, especially in Asia. 
4.4.2 The Scheme for the %paration of Super- and In6ra- Stmcture 
Public authorities have a responsibility to provide excess airport capacity, because rational 
private agents have no incentive to own excess facilities. In hct, private transportation 
idiastructure owners have a tendency to postpone large scale hcility investments. For example, 
the privatized British Airport Authority has tried to postpone the construction of the fZth passenger 
terminal at Heathrow Airport, and mjor Japanese private railroad companies have enjoyed 
adequate profits without large scale investments, which has resulted in heavily congested trains. 
As we mentioned above, Kansai Airport Company is organized as a joint stock corporation with 
investment fiom local governments and private companies, and therefore is not motivated to 
postpone large scale investments and seek excess profits. In fact, the filcilities investment plan of 
the company requires the permission of the central government. In other words, the company has 
no decision making power about its capacity, and related decisions are controlled by the 
government. In addition, the setting of its airport user charges, including the Passenger Service 
Facility Charge, is regulated by the Ministry of Transport. Therefore, in principle, if the 
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government orders the corporation to construct a new facility, the corporation can not r e b e  the 
order. 
However, the Phase 11 project would be extremely unprofitable if the Phase I financial scheme 
was adopted in Phase II. The government could not mandate the corporation to begin Phase 11 
without a new financial system. Furthermore, the government has proposed the separation of the 
Phase 11 project into foundation work and superstructure, and persuaded local governments and 
private companies in the Kansai area to finance a greater portion of the foundation work, which 
means that they have a much greater burden than in Phase I. 
Let us look closely at the separation scheme, the so-called the “separation of super- and infi;a- 
structure.” In the case of Phase II, superstructure is defined as ordinary airport facilities including 
runway and termid, while inhstructure means the foundation work of landfill for the second 
runway and second terminal. More concretely, it is reclamation and earthwork of the land for the 
second runway and terminal. Thus, the cost of foundation work replaces land acquisition costs in 
usual airport cmstructiou 
The costs of foundation work and superstructure in Phase II have been estimated at 1,140 
billion yen and 420 billion yen respectively. The Kansai International Airport Company is in 
charge of the superstructure. The financial scheme of the superstructure is roughly the same as 
that of Phase I, in which the amount of thvty percent of total cost is invested by governments and 
private companies. The central government is supposed to invest twenty percent, while only the 
private companies, not including the local governments, are required to invest the remaining ten 
percent. 
The official feasibility study indicated that with respect to the foundation work another twenty- 
five percent should be financed with zero interest. The rule of two to one for central government 
investment to regional investment is applied to this amount. The central government and the local 
governments will lend two thirds and one third respectively to the corporation, with zero interest. 
Also, each government is supposed to invest the same thirty percent of the total cost of foundation 
work. Table 4 shows the amounts of interest-free funds and their percentages of the total cost, 
which each agent finances for Phase 11 of Kansai Airport, and compares this to the financial 
scheme of Phase I. 
Table 4. The Sources and S h  of Interest-Free Funds 
Source: The Ministry of Transport 
21 
Proceedings of the First International Confffence of the ATRG of the WCTR Society, I997 
Besides the commitment of the central government, a portion of the burden of the airport 
facilities is allocated to private companies. The justification for this depends on the judgment that 
the operation of the airport facilities will be profitable in the long term. 
On the other hand, the land for the ahport continues to exist in the same place, and eternally 
yields tax revenues to local governments. This judgment can partially justify the burden increase 
for the local governments in the Kansai area. 
It may be worth pointing out that seventy percent of the superstructure costs and forty five 
percent of foundation work costs are financed by interest-bearing loans or by bonds, and that these 
loans and bonds are either guaranteed by the government or receive special treatment from the 
Japan Development Bank. The Japan Development Bank is a government financial institution, and 
offers special interest rates for developmental projects which the government identifies. The 
present interest rate in April 1997 is only 2.70%. 
4.5 Summary and Implications of the Fcnaneial Metbods 
In the previous section we have reviewed the financial systems of major international airports, 
and now we can summarize merits and demerits of each system fiom a comparative viewpoint and 
derive some policy implications. In section 4.5.1, we deal with the increase in flexibility of sources 
of airport improvement h d s .  And we discuss the changes in obligation of the central and local 
governments in 4.5.2. 
4.5.1 The increase in finadal &sib* 
Let us start this section with Table 5 which shows the relationships between financial methods 
and ownership categories. In Table 5, the symbols indicate the possibility and effectiveness of the 
financial systems. For example, circles indicate that each financial method is available and 
substantial, and crosscs mean that it is impossible or prohibited. Triangles represent that marked 
methods have limited effectiveness. 
User Fees: Each airline pays airport user charges for landing, airplane parking, etc. In the 
cases of public or joint-stock corporations, revenues fiom airlines directly contribute to corporate 
income. However, airport user charges of Haneda Airport only indirectly and insubstantially 
contribute to Haneda's projects, because its revenues are transferred to the Special Account for 
Airport Improvement. In othcr words the revenue pooling system applies to the airport. 
Passenger Service Facilities Charges, which are the most direct charge to final users of airports, 
are collected only by stand-alone corporations. All revenues fiom the charges are allocated to the 
airports which levy a charge for service. Therefore, the charges offer a source for financing 
capacity improvement of the airports. 
Government administered airports do not impose any charges on air passengers in Japan. In 
theory, it is possible to introduce Passenger Facility Charges in Japan similar to those in the United 
States. Rather, an appropriate increase in airport charges for airlines is needed to raise revenues 
for the Special Account, because landing fees for Class 1 airport have not changed since 1980. 
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OWnerthipCategory 
Finnnd?lMethad 
User Fees 
Airpoa charges 
Passenger Service Facilities Charge 
Borrowing fiom GllL 
Issuing Bonds placed to GIu* 
Issuing Bonds guaranteed by the Government** 
Bono- &om Bankr etc. 
Cow#SiOllS 
BoadsandLovls 
Central Government won-Interest Funds) 
Local Government won-Interest Funds) 
Private scdor (Non-htercst Funds) 
Governmeat Publk JdrBstock 
(Hall&) Varita) 
A 0 0 
X 0 0 
X A 0 
0 X X 
X 0 X 
X 0 0 
X X +  0 
0 0 0 
X X +  0 
X X 0 
Concessiom: Generally speaking, business activities by governments and public authorities are 
extremely restricted m Japan. Thus, Haneda Airport can not carry out coacession activities. In 
addition, most taminal buildings are institutionally and administratvely separated fiom airport 
providers and administrators. Concretely, most termioals including Haneda Airport are built and 
owned by joint stock corporations m which local governments, local private companies, banks, 
airlines and others invest. Thdcm,  the Special Account can not receive concession revenues, 
even if businesses are allowed into tbe airports. 
Narita Airport Authority and Kansai Airport Company own terminal buildings, and therefore 
can get concession revenues. The scope of activities for public corporations is highly d c t e d  to 
public actions by the articles of corporation. Thus, the concession revenues of Narita Airport are 
more restricted than Kansai Airport. In conclusion, with respect to cclacessions a joint-stock 
corporation is more flexile than a public corporation. 
Bonds and l[AwILp: All types of airports use bonds andor loans to finance their capacity 
improvement. Bonds and loans are redeemed by fbture revenues. All three systems can utilize 
interest bearing ilxmmen ts, although actual procedures and forms depend on airport ownership. 
The government controls improvermat and expansion plans of all three airports, and also controls 
their financial plans. Therefore, the flexibility of bonds and loans does not depend on airport 
ownemhip. One can say that the Ministry of Finance decides amounts and conditions of bonds and 
loanS. 
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Central Government: It goes without saying that the central government has a duty to 
improve the international airport system. The Airport Improvement Act of 1956 mandates full 
central government responsibility for the system. However, the reduction in its burden portion is 
unavoidable and reasonable when its financial ability is limited. 
L a d  Government: In principle, local governments are not allowed to invest in Class 1 
airports, and so can not invest in Haneda Airport. The possibility of investment in public 
corporations by local governments depends on their authorization laws. However, local 
governments near Narita Airport would not have invested in the airport, because negative effects 
such as noise are considerable. Even if local governments recognize its positive economic effkcts, 
they can not spend local tax revenues on the airport, because many taxpayers, mostly farmers, 
have strongly opposed its construction. 
One of the purposes of the formation of the Kansai Airport Company as a joint-stock 
corporation is to allow local governments and private companies to invest in the company. Kansai 
Airport Company sets a good precedent for the "returns of development gains" of large scale 
infrastructure improvement through a joint-stock corporation system. 
Private Sector. Private companies can not invest in public corporations nor government 
agencies. Only the joint-stock corporation system offers an opportunity of investment to the 
private sector. Of course, private enterprises have no incentive to invest in a corporation if it is 
unprofitable. It is controversial whether investment in Kansai Airport Company is economically 
rational, because its prohbility is not Cgtain. In this case, we may say that the central 
government fixed private enterprises to invcst in the Kansai Airport Company. But, it seems 
more reasonable that the central government succeeded in making them return their development 
gains to the Kansai Airport Company. 
Suppose that the feasibility study was accurate and the Kansai Airport Company becomes 
profitable. We also know that purely private project of the airport is not fkasible. This means that 
the financial support fiom governments has decreased project risk to the extent that private agents 
can calculate their profits and losses and are willing to invest in the Company. Regardless of the 
expectations of the private sector, the central government has succeeded in obtaining funding fiom 
private enterprises. 
4.53 The Changes in roles of governments 
Here we discuss the changes in the extent of the obligation of the central and local governments. 
To discuss the extent of obligation is to make the cost allocation pattern clear. In other words, we 
deal with the changes of the burden pattern of international airport improvement as institutional 
Let us begin with the central government. Who pays for the central government? The general 
answer is taxpayers. But, as we mentioned in previous sections, in the case of airports, air 
transportation users supply most of the revenues for the Special Account for Airport Improvement. 
The allocation of monetary costs to each generation depends on the timing of the redemption of 
principal and interest of bonds and/or loans. Besides the scale of concessions and subsidization for 
form changes. 
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other airports, the temporary public corporation system is the same as a government ownership 
system fiom the viewpoint of the final payers. As we mentioned in 4.2, Narita Airport will be 
transferred to the national airport pooling system, when total principal and interest of the bonds are 
redeemed. Therefore, the role of the central government was not substantially changed by the 
introduction of the public corporation system. 
Rather, its role seemed to be expanded to concessions. Joint-stock corporations in which local 
governments and private sector invest have charge of the construction and operation of taminals in 
government-owned airports. No central government agencies could operate concession businesses 
in airports until Narita Airport Authority was established. 
From the viewpoint of the opportunity cost of h d s ,  the present generation can not shift the 
burden to future generations, because they can not use the re~~urces of future generations. 
However, the present generation can change the pattern of burden and distribution of future 
generations. For example, if the government finances airport improvement by issuing bonds 
instead of by taxation, it gathers funds h m  the capital market and can reduce fees which the 
present users pay. Thus, the present central government makes sure that transfer fiom users to 
bond holders wil l  be completed in the future, though the future central government can also 
postpone this transfer to more distant future generations. 
In short, to abolish a oneyear budget system, which does not include any bonds and loans, 
means that the government mitigates the restriction on the burden allocation pattern among airport 
users in hture generations. Issuing bonds and borrowing expand the power of the present central 
government. 
In principle, economic agents are willing to buy bonds and lend money, even though the central 
government highly controls the systems of issuing bonds and borrowing for airports. Compared 
with airport charges which are regarded as a kind of tax, it is easier to raise money through bonds 
and loans. Their introduction gives the central government more flexibility and choice in fund 
raising. 
On the other hand, the introduction of the joint-stock corporation system explicitly does not 
increase and may wen reduce the scope of central government involvement. Provision of interest- 
fiee funds has the same effect as subsidization of the amounts of foregone interest attributed to the 
funds. In addition to the twenty percent which the central government invested, Kansai Airport 
required another ten percent of total costs as interest-fiee investments. Local gov-ts and 
private companies were responsible for this ten percent, which means that the commitment of the 
central government was relatively reduced. 
It is noteworthy that the responsibility of governments for the Second Phase of Kansai Airport 
has been greater than for previous projects. Theoretical justification of this increase is attributed to 
excess capacity for free competition of air transportation services. If this justification is accepted, 
we have to carefully consider who should pay for the excess capacity. The final payers differ in 
the case of the central government from the case of local governments. Central government funds 
are financed by present airport users, because the central government spends money from the 
25 
Proceedings of the First International Confireme of the ATRG of the WCTR Society, 1997 
Special Account. On the other hand, local governments have to finance the funds by imposing tax 
andor issuing bonds. These bonds are general obligation but not revenue bonds. Thus, taxpayers 
in the Kansai region bear the responsibility. However, it may be reasonable that the central 
government increases general h d s  for excess capacity. 
If excess capacity of the airport will bring benefits only to future air transportation users, the 
expenditure fiom the Special Account is justi6ed. In this case, the increase in local government 
burden is not nezessarily jllstified, ifthe burden portion of the First Phase is appropriate fiom the 
viewpoint of the “returns of development gains.” We derive a difFerent answer when we suppose 
that the first burden portion of the region was smaller than optimal, or that the excess capacity 
benefits regional economic activities in the future. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
There are several implications from the experience of Japanese airport improvement strategies 
and related financial policies. 
First, the establishment of Narita Airport Authority as a temporary public corporation which 
introduced the separation fiom the revenue pooling system created a stand-alone finance system for 
this new metropolitan international airport. This strategy and goal are similar to those during the 
establishment boom of airport authorities in the United States in the 1960’s. However, it is a 
unique situation that Narita Airport Authority is not a going concern as are airport authorities in 
the United States and other Western countries. In principle, Narita Airport will be brought into the 
national pooling system, when all of its bonds and loans are redeemed. In spite of this principle, 
probably the Authority will be privatized. Thus, one possibility is that the revenue fiom selling the 
equity will be trans- to the investment capital for the Third Tokyo Metropolitan Airport 
through the Special Account. 
Second, the purpose of the formation of the Kansai International Airport Company as a joint- 
stock corporation is to collect funds fiom local governments and the private sector, but not to 
obtain an improvement of efficiency as in the case of the British Airport Authority. This method is 
effective, because the acquisition of interest-& funds is significant and crucial for the feasibility 
of such large scale projects. A variation of this method has been applied to the Second Phase of 
Kansai Airport which is known as one of the ‘Wew Three Big Projects”. It is reasonable to expect 
that the joint-stock corporation system will be applied to two other projects, Chubu Airport and the 
Third Tokyo Metropolitan Airport. 
If this method is applied to the Third Tokyo Metropolitan Airport, the Tokyo area will have 
three different ownership type airports, namely H a n d  as government ownership, Narita as a 
public corporation, and the Third Airport as a joint-stock corporation. These three airports are 
potentially substitutes for each other. Therefore, several problems will have to be solved, for 
example, traffic allocation rules, coordination of airport user charges, and the possibility of the 
privatization of Narita Airport. 
26 
k h i r o  OHTA, Airport Improvement Policy in Japan: New Methods of Airport Finance 
Regardless of this necessary coordination, the joint-stock corporation method is effective as a 
financing tool. In addition, this method is justified by the principle of the "returns of development 
gains". As a policy implication, the joint-stock corporation system for new airport construction 
can be useful in countries, such as those in East Asia, with high population density and increases of 
air transportation. 
Finally, the larger responsibility of the central government for Phase II of Kansai Airport has an 
important policy implication. In air transportation, capacity shortage of airports is a crucial 
impediment to fiee and fair competition among air carriers. Governments, especially national 
governments, have to be responsible for redundant capacity of transportation inhstructure, such 
as international airports. Therefore, national governments are obligated to provide excess capacity 
in mjor international airports in order to promote fiee competition of air transportation, even 
though airport privatbtion currently prevails in the world. 
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